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Introduction 
The inspiration for my thesis topic came from an unlikely source. Having never 
taken an art or art history course, I encountered an essay in the New English Review 
entitled “The Tyranny of Artistic Modernism.” In this essay, the authors described the 
modernist aesthetic that dominates our age, tying architectural and literary theory into 
their analysis of social and cultural changes. While their essay is highly critical of 
modernism and its descendent, postmodernism, and the authors are clearly writing from a 
traditionalist perspective, they described and illuminated a particularly fascinating 
dichotomy. In this dichotomy, the authors distinguish between the traditional and the 
modern conceptions of freedom, proposing that the difference is that the former views 
“freedom as a perfection of essence rather than a liberation from it.”1 While it is clear that 
in this context they define freedom in the artistic sense of self-expression, creative 
liberty, and professional fulfillment, this idea need not be applied only to aesthetic theory.  
 Most academics are quick to recognize the relationship between aesthetic, social, 
and political theory, as the three spheres seem to evolve contemporaneously and to gain 
independent value only as they influence and permeate the other spheres. A primary 
academic and personal interest of mine is social theory and its complex relationship with 
political, religious, psychological, and economic issues. With this in mind, I am applying 
the perfection of versus liberation from essence dichotomy to an analysis of areas other 
than art. I am particularly interested in the sociological implications of feminist ideology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mark Signorelli and Nikos Salingaros, “The Tyranny of Artistic Modernism,” New 
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and its relationship to postmodernism, with postmodern understood to describe both an 
intellectual theory and the twentieth-century condition of knowledge.2 
If there is indeed a strong link between postmodernism and feminism, then it is 
reasonable to ask whether any flaws identified in postmodern theory might also be 
identified in feminist theory, and whether the same ideas postmodern theory rejects are 
also rejected by feminists. Assuming there is a link between postmodernism and 
feminism, then it makes sense to assess to what extent the perfection of versus liberation 
from essence dichotomy might be concretely at play in feminist ideology. In order to 
explore this in my thesis, I argue that the contemporary and dominant strains of feminist 
ideology are strongly influenced by postmodernism. In particular, I am interested in the 
freedom as liberation from essence view as a core aspect of postmodernism, and I will 
argue that this view is present in and even underlies much of contemporary feminist 
thought in both the academic and public spheres. Next, I will argue that a liberation from 
essence view is limiting and perhaps even damaging to the feminist cause, and I will 
attempt to articulate a more constructive approach.  
The thesis is informed by thought from several different fields, including 
postmodern aesthetic theory, poststructuralist philosophy, feminist theory and 
epistemology, and cognitive sociology. In the first chapter, I review the scholarship on 
postmodernism and its roots as an aesthetic theory. I show how what began as a 
movement among artists and writers eventually began to dominate in the broader 
academic and public realms, eventually becoming not just an obscure theory but also an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated 
by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984). 
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actual “condition” of society. The idea of postmodernism as a condition comes from 
Jean-Francois Lyotard’s work, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. As 
Lyotard describes, “The postmodern would be that which…puts forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the 
consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for 
the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them 
but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable.”3 In order to do this, authors 
and artists must work outside of the rituals of piety that have previously prevented people 
from portraying and encountering the unpresentable. They must endeavor to “free” 
themselves, or to pursue artistic and professional fulfillment, by breaking from previous 
traditions, standards, or modes of expression. 
This condition is based on a certain understanding of human nature – one that is 
contested by traditionalist critics. The practice of displaying and expressing this 
misunderstanding began with the modern art movement, but, as Lyotard describes, 
evolved into a postmodern condition of society throughout the twentieth century. The 
goal of this chapter is to describe postmodernism as it originated in art and literature, and 
to describe in detail how the postmodern theoretical framework constitutes a condition of 
society, in the sense that it guides the “state of knowledge” and the ways of knowing, 
including an understanding of human nature. It is crucial to contextualize this thoroughly 
in order to successfully make my argument about feminist theory and to analyze it using 
cognitive sociology.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid, 81. 
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Sociologist Ben Agger wrote extensively about the sociological relevance of 
postmodernism and its siblings, the fields of critical theory and poststructuralism. As he 
describes them, “Critical theory, poststructuralism, and postmodernism are effective as 
critiques of positivism, interrogating taken-for-granted assumptions about the ways in 
which people write and read science.”4 Agger summarizes the basic tenets of each school 
of thought. Critical theory, pioneered by the Frankfurt School, attempted to understand 
why Marx’s revolutions did not occur as predicted. Its members put forth the notion that 
“Capitalism deepens false consciousness, suggesting to people that the existing social 
system is both inevitable and rational.”5 It follows from this that instead of recognizing 
opportunities for transformation and change, as predicted, “people ‘falsely’ experience 
their lives as products of unchangeable social nature.”6 In other words, the victims of 
capitalism are in denial because they are manipulated by the capitalist system to believe 
that there is no alternative.  
The classical sociological explanation for this was that “people obey because they 
share certain common values and beliefs”—what Durkheim called the collective 
consciousness. People’s behavior and inclination to seemingly conform and simply 
accept their condition, even under the supposedly oppressive capitalist system, was 
motivated by a search for universal meaning and explanation for the ways of the world 
and one’s place in society.7 The Frankfurt School thinkers saw the positivism of capitalist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ben Agger. "Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological 
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ideology as indicative of the Enlightenment and classical liberalism’s limitations. The 
attempts of Enlightenment thinkers to demystify religion and to promote a scientific 
approach to knowledge were grounded in positivism and were thus not sufficient to 
achieve a true state of objectivism.8 It might appear that the conflict I have identified is 
not so much between the traditionalists and the moderns as it is within the various 
factions of modern liberal and progressive thought – between the classical liberals, the 
Marxists, the Frankfurt School, and the feminists. However, even within modern liberal 
and progressive thought, there are more and less radical notions of freedom and its 
relation to “essence.” Durkheim’s notion of collective consciousness helps us to 
understand how we might conceive of freedom as perfection of essence in the modern 
context: assuming there are, as Durkheim claims, “a set of shared beliefs, ideas and moral 
attitudes which operate as a unifying force within society,” which might constitute a sort 
of human essence, then the effort to express, understand, or analyze these aspects would 
be the pursuit of freedom as perfection of essence.  
In order to escape the constraints of these notions, the Frankfurt School’s critical 
theorists attempted “to develop a mode of consciousness and cognition that breaks the 
identity of reality and rationality, viewing social facts not as inevitable constraints on 
human freedom but as pieces of history that can be changed.”9 It is in this that we can see 
the idea of a liberation from essence point of view: the idea that there is no grand 
narrative, no singular purpose or meaning, only conditions and constructions that can be 
changed and revolutionized in order to reach an authentic state of freedom. Agger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid, 109. 
9 Ibid, 109.	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connects poststructuralism and postmodernism to critical theory by emphasizing their 
similar aversion to positivist definitions and categories. He defines poststructuralism as a 
theory of knowledge and language, while defining postmodernism as an analogous theory 
of society, culture, and history.10 Agger echoes Lyotard’s conception of a postmodern 
social theory that “would refuse the totalizing claims of grand narratives like Marxism 
that attempt to identify axial structural principles explaining all manner of disparate 
social phenomena.”11  
In the second chapter, I present a brief history on the American feminist 
movement, focused primarily on the 1960s to the present. The purpose of this chapter is 
to trace the evolution of some of the fundamental feminist ideas and to gain a better 
understanding of the nature of the movement in its current iteration. This chapter contains 
both historical descriptions of the feminist movement and concrete examples of the 
liberation from essence feminist mindset as I define it in this thesis. In the third chapter, I 
argue that feminism in academia is influenced by the postmodern condition and by 
poststructuralist philosophy, as coterminous movements, and in doing so I evaluate 
several current attempts by feminist philosophers to address this issue. Part of the 
difficulty of this thesis is that it involves defining several sweeping terms that can be used 
to describe a variety of ideas and groups. For the sake of clarity, my focus is on so-called 
“second-wave” contemporary American feminism, and I will use categories of feminism, 
as defined by well-regarded feminist scholars, to differentiate between particular schools 
of feminist thought. These scholars are Christina Hoff Sommers, who has pioneered the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid, 112. 
11 Ibid, 116.	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more conservative notion of freedom feminism, and Linda Alcoff, a feminist philosopher, 
who identified two primary categories of modern feminist: the cultural feminists and the 
poststructuralist feminists. In this chapter, I break the analysis into two realms: the 
influence of postmodernism in addressing theoretical issues in feminist philosophy, and 
the influence of postmodernism on feminist pedagogy in university and educational 
settings. 
In the fourth chapter, I argue that the link between feminism and postmodernism 
weakens the feminist cause, based on the flawed liberation from essence theory, and I 
will demonstrate this using a theoretical framework from cognitive sociology. In contrast 
to the previous chapter, the focus of this chapter is on feminism’s role in the public 
sphere. There are multiple “dissident” feminists such as Camille Paglia and Christina 
Hoff Sommers whose attempts to dissent from the party line have resulted in attacks and 
attempts at censorship by their supposed peers. A full examination of the feminist 
marketplace of ideas will help to illustrate the strand of postmodern thinking that I wish 
to critique in the feminist movement, and it will also illuminate the alternative approaches 
to feminism that I hope to examine and highlight.  
I evaluate feminism as a “thought community,” drawing on Eviatar Zerubavel’s 
concept to demonstrate that the movement in its current iteration is limiting itself to a 
radical postmodern notion that is incompatible with more traditional or even classical 
liberal conceptions of freedom and equality. Zerubavel, a pioneer of cognitive sociology, 
argues that the traditional approaches to studying cognition—cognitive individualism and 
cognitive universalism—are not sufficient. Recognizing the limitations of cognitive 
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individualism, which emphasizes subjectivity and personal experiences and sees humans 
as thinking primarily as individuals, Zerubavel also criticizes the attachment to cognitive 
universalism. He claims that cognitive universalism and its concern with how we think as 
human beings prevents cognitive scientists from studying the major cognitive differences 
that do not arise from fundamental biological differences. These two approaches, while 
useful, ignore the social dimension of cognition. 
 Zerubavel sees cognitive sociology as a way to avoid the reductionism that is 
common when approaching cognition. His understanding of the value of cognitive 
sociology is that “in highlighting the social aspects of cognition, cognitive sociology 
reminds us that we think not only as individuals and as human beings, but also as social 
beings, products of particular social environments that affect as well as constrain the way 
we cognitively interact with the world.”12 This discipline can be traced in part to Karl 
Mannheim, who said “it is not isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in 
certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought…strictly speaking it is 
incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he 
participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him.”13 
In order to better describe the social dimension of cognition, Zerubavel posits the 
idea of thought communities as the areas of influence that are larger than the individual 
but smaller than the entire human race. Thought communities could be churches, 
professions, nations, or political and ideological schools. It follows from this conception 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6. 
13 Ibid, 8. 
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of cognition that just because we commonly share certain “mindscapes” does not mean 
that they are naturally or logically inevitable. Cognitive sociology enables us to study 
thought communities in a more nuanced way because it “helps us avoid the danger of 
regarding the merely conventional as if it were part of the natural order by specifically 
highlighting that which is not entirely subjective yet at the same time not entirely 
objective either.” 14 This approach is particularly useful for studying feminism and its 
relationship to postmodernism, as there are concerns about this coming out of the 
feminist academic community itself, with feminist scholars raising concerns about the 
way feminism as a school of thought constructs its knowledge. Linda Alcoff asked a 
particularly apt question:  
Why is a right-wing woman's consciousness constructed via social 
discourse but a feminist's consciousness not? Poststructuralist 
critiques of subjectivity pertain to the construction of all subjects 
or they pertain to none. And here is precisely the dilemma for 
feminists: How can we ground a feminist politics that deconstructs 
the female subject? Nominalism threatens to wipe out feminism 
itself.15 
 
This question speaks to the root of the problem and ties in nicely with Zerubavel’s theory 
- any thought community, ideology, or group is equally subject to the constraints of 
subjectivity and construction. For one particular ideology, such as feminism, to claim that 
it is not, is particularly threatening not just to its own cause but also to anyone who is 
deemed to fall outside of its approval. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid, 9.	  15	  Linda Alcoff, “Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory,” in Feminism and Philosophy: Essential Readings in Theory, 
Reinterpretation and Application, ed. Nancy Tuana and Rosemarie Tong (Boulder: San 
Francisco, 1995), 12.	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Zerubavel is also useful as an observer of postmodernism as a thought community 
with its own “style” of organizing the world in the mind. Echoing the ideas of aesthetic 
theorists, he filters their observations through the lens of cognitive sociology: 
The works of Cummings, Joyce, Picasso, Pirandello, and Mondrian 
are distinctively modern. So, of course, are glass architecture, 
multinational corporations, and the Internet…Indeed, we might 
think of them as different manifestations of a single, unmistakably 
fuzzy-minded vision of the world…What distinctively 
characterized the modern (as well as the ‘postmodern’) way of 
thinking, ‘is not just another redrawing of the cultural map—the 
moving of a few disputed borders…but an alteration of the 
principles of mapping. Something is happening to the way we 
think about the way we think.’ 16 
 
Finally, I conclude this thesis by offering an alternative – and hopefully more productive 
- version of feminism that addresses the weaknesses engendered by the postmodern 











From Aesthetics to Ideology: The Twentieth Century Postmodern Condition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology, 6. 
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"Personally, I am not greatly interested in what is said about art. But, if I had to give an 
opinion, I would put it this way: everything that has a sense of humanity, a sense of 
modernity, is interesting; everything that lacks these is worthless.” –Edouard Manet 
 
 With Edouard Manet and his fellow nineteenth-century Impressionist painters, 
including Monet, Degas, and Cezanne, the groundwork was laid for the conventions and 
ideals of Modernism to fully blossom in the twentieth century. The Impressionists 
certainly represented a break from tradition: they painted still lives and landscapes; they 
delved into the cognitive aspect of art, painting what they saw en plein air; they captured 
candid moments of ordinary lives. Despite their radicalism, however, the Impressionists 
were classically trained, and as a distinct movement, its members adhered to standards of 
technique and form; furthermore, the movement is considered a defensive response to the 
invention of photographs and cameras. Manet’s statement reveals the tender balance that 
the Impressionists clung to: their radical tendencies contrasted with their adherence to 
standards and resistance to change. In Manet’s world, humanity and modernity were 
intertwined and existed perhaps only in relation to each other - the Impressionists’ radical 
approaches to art paid homage to the past in their attempts to reconcile the limitation of 
the traditional medium, paint, with the modern demand for candidness and sensation.  
 It is difficult now to imagine a member of the modernist legacy making such a 
statement - first to posit such a close relationship between humanity and modernity, then 
to attach intrinsic value to such a relationship. Manet’s musings seem almost naïve 
considering the ways the modernist movement manifested itself and eventually gave way 
to the postmodernist movement in the twentieth-century aesthetic sphere. This twentieth-
century postmodernism, primarily an aesthetic theory, has permeated the academic realm, 
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with significant implications for the evolution of social and political thought both inside 
and outside the confines of academia. Jean-Francois Lyotard captures the meaning and 
scope of postmodernism, claiming, “the word is in current use on the American continent 
among sociologists and critics; it designates the state of our culture following the 
transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game 
rules of science, literature, and the arts.” 17  This definition of the term is key in 
understanding the ways in which postmodern ideas exist in intellectual spheres and 
permeate many aspects of culture, academia, and policy. That Lyotard refers to 
postmodernism as a condition of a society, specifically the highly developed American 
society, is indicative of its scope and complexity. Signorelli and Salingaros also observe 
the extent to which postmodernism is entrenched in Western society: “Standing behind 
this aesthetic is an ideology supported by nearly the entire institutional structure of the 
Western world - the universities, the publishing houses, the galleries, the journals, the 
prize committees, the zoning boards.”18 It therefore is crucial to understand the roots of 
postmodernism and the postmodern cultural and intellectual condition if we are to 
properly understand the social and political changes that accompanied it. 
Postmodernism gained traction as a set of theories connected by “their demotion 
of reason, their radical epistemological relativism, their dismissal of or representing as 
inaccessible social and historical reality, and their undeniable political pessimism.”19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, xxiii. 
18 Mark Signorelli and Nikos Salingaros, “The Tyranny of Artistic Modernism.”  	  
19 Michael Rectenwald, "Postmodernism, the Academic Left, and the Crisis of 
Capitalism," Insurgent Notes Journal of Communist Theory and Practice 8 (2013). 
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Broadly speaking, these theories were a reaction to and rejection of the Enlightenment 
and its appeal to rationality and human progress as well as any traditional idea of a 
complex world order or human nature. Embedded in this criticism is the key concept of 
“master narratives” - tools of oppression that are used to shape social and political 
structures in grand and all-encompassing ways. Such narratives, endemic in the West, are 
designed by those in power to maintain the hegemony of the dominant class - as defined 
by economic class, gender, and other demographic characteristics - over the oppressed 
Other.  
As explained by Frederick Turner in his essay Epic Arts, “One of the major 
theories of the postmodern movement held that our political, juridical and economic lives 
were governed by social and cultural “grand narratives” or “master narratives…The 
disciplines of the arts and crafts, the forces of advertising and popular culture, even the 
natural sciences, were “social constructions,” reinforcing “logocentric,” “Eurocentric” or 
“phallocentric” regimes of power and knowledge.”20 The task of postmodernists, then, 
was not to modify or alter the narratives; rather, their mission was the circumlocution or 
destruction of the narratives entirely. This perpetual process of destruction is a defining 
aspect of postmodernism: there must always be some other system or structure that needs 
to be extirpated. Turner describes the modern period (and the postmodernism that 
followed) as “the moment when the destruction of grand narratives came to be valued for 
itself rather than for the better system that could replace it,” a contrast to the traditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://insurgentnotes.com/2013/03/postmodernism-the-academic-left-and-the-crisis-of-
capitalism/. 
20 Frederick Turner, “Epic Arts.” American Arts Quarterly 26 (2009), 23. 
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imperative which was “always to find some new story that would do the good and 
valuable things the old story had done, while avoiding the old story’s clumsiness, 
irrationality, narrowness or injustice.”21 The postmodern imperative can be seen as an 
attempt to break free or become liberated from the grand narratives; in contrast, the 
traditional imperative was to perfect or improve upon these narratives.  
This attempt to break from traditional narrative forms played out quite radically in 
the aesthetic sphere, as the twentieth century ushered in major changes in the 
vocabularies and theories of visual art, architecture, music, and literature. James Wilson 
describes these changes critically in his essay Unleashed from the Exemplar:  
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the visual, 
musical and poetic arts each suffered related but distinct 
revolutions. Arnold Schoenberg introduced atonality, or serialism, 
a new musical vocabulary to replace melody…Visual 
artists…experimented with Cubist and other techniques that 
attempted to represent formal qualities abstracted from the lush 
profusion of everyday appearance. This led to painting and 
sculpture of pure form, which ceased to derive evidently from 
forms found in nature.22  
 
In this description, Schoenberg’s attempt to replace melody and Cubism’s avoidance of 
natural forms represent revolts against the narratives of tradition and hegemony. These 
efforts were interpreted and championed by critics who saw human life and its 
byproducts, including art, as unstable and impermanent. Critics of the early twentieth 
century such as T.E. Hulme “sought to limit the appearance of time’s effects in artwork; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid.	  
22 James Matthew Wilson, “Unleashed from the Exemplar: The Fate of Narrative in 
Modern Art.” American Arts Quarterly 26 (2009), 40. 
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[Clive] Bell eviscerates the artwork of every sort of content. Form alone remains.”23 
Clive Bell, an English critic active during the early twentieth century, was a proponent of 
formalism, the view that the formal properties of a piece of art are the only things that 
make it art. According to formalist theory, art’s aesthetic value is not derived from what 
it represents, the context in which the object was made, or the intention of its creator. Of 
the deeper meaning or symbolism one might find in art, Bell claimed,  
Representation is a sign of weakness in an artist. A painter too 
feeble to create forms that provoke more than a little aesthetic 
emotion will try to eke that little out by suggesting the emotions of 
life. To evoke the emotions of life he must use 
representation… But if in the artist an inclination to play upon the 
emotions of life is often the sign of a flickering inspiration, in the 
spectator a tendency to seek, behind form, the emotions of life is a 
sign of defective sensibility always.24  
 
Bell and his peers saw the “emotions of life” as unnecessary if not damaging to 
understanding art, and criticized both artists and spectators who sought such meaning in 
art. The idea that the viewer is not supposed to ascribe any tangible meaning or worldly 
significance to art is the truly radical notion of postmodernism—the idea that such art can 
and should operate outside of the human reality. These are the foundational ideas of 
artistic postmodernism, and reflect some of its more abstract and seemingly intangible 
aspects.  
It is clear from this understanding of postmodern theoretical concepts that in order 
for these ideas to gain traction, artists and spectators had to break completely from 
traditional narratives, conventions, and techniques. The effect of their implementation in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid, 42.	  
24 Clive Bell, Art (New York: Capricorn, 1958). 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16917/16917-h/16917-h.htm. 
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art and music is that “aesthetics as a philosophy itself becomes abstract and narrow. The 
concepts of representation or mimesis…become a matter of indifference. The 
effect…was to silence the natural act of interpretation that begins with and extends 
beyond narrative content.”25 This silencing, however, is considered by some to be limited 
in its effectiveness. The basis for this critique is that human nature contains some sort of 
essential interpretive drive that pieces the parts into a whole, assigning meaning and 
purpose to otherwise unexplainable events, items, and ideas. It is impossible to escape 
from this type of response to narrative: French phenomenologist Paul Ricoeur argued that 
time and narrative are the very conditions of human life. Not only is it impossible to 
escape these conditions, but also it is impossible to think outside of them. 26 
Postmodernism, in denying the existence of these essential conditions of humanity, 
denies the interpreter any right to interpret. It enforces silence, leaving the interpreter able 
only to observe the form of the painting, poem, or music. As Wilson quips, “Form is 
significant, but what does it signify? What does it say? It says itself, like breath without 
words.”27 More important than postmodernist theory itself, however, is where the projects 
and works of postmodern thinkers and artists lead. What is the effect of such extreme 
abstraction on the quality and content of music, literature, art, and architecture?  
One answer is that the implementation of these theories in the aesthetic sphere has 
led to abstraction with primarily destructive effects. As Wilson describes it, “Such poets 
used collage and fragmentation to disrupt the formation of words into language, in hopes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 James Matthew Wilson, “Unleashed from the Exemplar: The Fate of Narrative in 
Modern Art,” 42.	  
26 Ibid, 44. 
27 Ibid, 43. 
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of escaping the “capitalist” and “colonial” “prison house” of discourse…these poets use 
only two tropes: the representation of debased commercialized language and the liberated 
language of nonsense.”28 This culmination in nonsense is considered the natural endpoint 
of such experiments, primarily because the constraints of time and narrative cannot be 
escaped. The concept of time, beginnings and ends, is not a social construct or a 
subjective experience - it is a reality. Any attempt to end or operate outside of master 
narratives, then, is futile because such an effort is in itself articulating a narrative.  
Given these limitations, it is not surprising that one of the major criticisms of 
postmodern theories such as Bell’s is that they deny the reality and significance of time - 
beginnings, ends, and the nature of life itself - in dictating how we interpret and 
experience everything, including art. It is the nature of time and the finitude of life, 
according to critics, that gives our creations emotional meaning. As expressed by Wilson,  
The metaphysical error of these otherwise rich claims lies in their 
locating the “categorical imperative” to narrate within the 
subjectivity of the person, rather than in the nature of reality as 
such. We are forced to think in terms of time not because of some 
condition of our consciousness, but simply because time is a 
reality…The inevitable reality of everything in time is a beginning 
and an end. This finitude of things makes them intrinsically 
dramatic.29  
 
Bell’s aesthetic theory operates outside the concept of narratives or any sort of universal 
meaning or understanding, and instead argues that the great works of art have only in 
common their “significant form.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid. 	  
29 Ibid. 
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He further extrapolates: “What is this quality? What quality is shared by all 
objects that provoke our aesthetic emotions? What quality is common to Sta. Sophia and 
the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chinese carpets, Giotto’s 
frescoes at Padua, and the masterpieces of Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cezanne? 
Only one answer seems possible - significant form.”30 By significant form, Bell means 
that there are particular combinations of colors, line, and space that will universally 
provoke aesthetic emotions; it is the only essential quality that allows the spectator to 
distinguish art from everything else.  
Bell seems to have anticipated the criticism that would be made by future 
philosophers, those who probingly ask why certain forms or techniques mean more than 
others, with the obvious answer being that there are certain essential qualities of art that 
resonate in the human mind and certain qualities that do not. However, he deems the 
criticism irrelevant:  
Also at this point a query arises, irrelevant indeed, but hardly to be 
suppressed: “Why are we so profoundly moved by forms related in 
a particular way?” The question is extremely interesting, but 
irrelevant to aesthetics. In pure aesthetics we have only to consider 
our emotion and its object: for the purposes of aesthetics we have 
no right, neither is there any necessity, to pry behind the object into 
the state of mind of him who made it.31  
 
Bell’s emphasis on the subjectivity of experience and interpretation, and his criticism of 
art that attempts to represent or describe, is especially significant considering the context 
in which he was writing. As a witness of the industrial revolution and scientific 
modernization, Bell saw first-hand the myriad ways in which society was rapidly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Clive Bell, Art. 31	  Ibid.	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changing. Perhaps most relevant to his focus on aesthetics is the invention of the camera 
and the increasing use and popularity of photography. His place in the midst of these 
changes perhaps motivated him to differentiate theoretically between paintings that 
function as “interesting and amusing” documents - much the way photographs do - and a 
true work of art.32  
In the introduction to Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, Frederic Jameson 
extrapolates on this concept:   
…we are now in a position to think or conceptualize scientific 
research in a very different way from the Newtonian period…this 
“break” now links up with the other thematics of Lyotard’s essay 
by way of an event generally taken primarily to be an aesthetic 
one, although it has relatively immediate philosophical and 
ideological analogues: I am referring to the so-called crisis of 
representation, in which an essential epistemology, which 
conceives of representation as the reproduction, for subjectivity, of 
an objectivity that lies outside it...33  
 
It is clear from Jameson’s remarks, written in the late twentieth century, that the 
postmodern conception of representation, narrative, and essence still exists in the 
contemporary mind.  
Lyotard articulates an understanding of narratives that sheds light on how they are 
viewed in the postmodern school of thought. He explains, “Narratives, as we have seen, 
determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how they are to be applied. They thus 
define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are 
themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what 
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33 Jean-François Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, viii. 
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they do.”34 Postmodern artists, writers, and thinkers, then, aimed to operate outside of this 
narrative mindset. This idea certainly manifested itself in visual art as early as the era in 
which Bell and the Cubists were at work. However, critics of the movement and its 
theoretical basis point out how these ideas played out and evolved over the course of the 
twentieth century: “The early modes of abstraction, such as Cubism, at most lessened the 
usual dependence on narrative as a source of subject matter for representation. But early 
abstraction set the stage for a radicalization severing visual form tout court from any 
narrative origin, and this radicalization became the main tradition of modern visual art.”35 
Wilson observes that while the initial ideas comprising modernism in art were not 
extremely radical and did not truly mark a break from traditional artistic technique or 
inspiration, over the long-term they served to create an entirely new and seemingly 
paradoxical tradition out of revolt against and abstraction of tradition. Wilson continues 
in his critique of the postmodern tradition, arguing, “Modernist artworks, especially at the 
thought-silencing extremes of abstraction, have themselves become characters in the 
story of art, no more “liberated” from the conditions of time and narrative than their 
predecessors. This is a detour in the historical practice of art, the classical understanding 
of the fine arts as poesis, the making of plots.”36 This criticism is rooted in two 
assumptions: first, the understanding of human existence as defined at least in part by its 
finitude and temporal nature; second, the belief that in order to derive meaning or 
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understanding from art, we are not only inclined to but are bound to interpret it in relation 
to its narrative and chronological properties.  
The argument in favor of this view is both cognitive and philosophical, and one’s 
understanding probably has implications for whether or not one can sympathize with 
postmodernism or agree with Wilson. Wilson echoes the sentiments of many other critics 
and thinkers, who further extrapolate on the paradox of postmodernism by identifying the 
pervasiveness of the narrative in our most basic functioning as humans: “Thought and life 
alike resolve themselves in narrative terms. We might punctuate this phenomenological 
claim with an ideological one. Frederic Jameson has argued in Marxist terms that 
narratives may be false, but they are no less ineluctable. To speak of an end to “master 
narratives” is itself to articulate a narrative.”37 It is this postmodern anti-narrative 
narrative and its influence on the contemporary public sphere that are particularly 
fascinating.  
Signorelli and Salingaros touched on one of the major themes found in criticisms 
of postmodern theory. They describe postmodernism as “the misunderstanding of 
freedom as liberation from essence rather than perfection of essence.”38 This dichotomy, 
revealed in postmodern aesthetic theory, can also be found at work in other postmodern 
intellectual and political realms. In particular, it is interesting to consider whether and 
how the dominance of the liberation from essence ideal impacted the American feminist 
movement. Given the critiques of this specific theory and postmodernism more generally, 	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it is necessary to consider the impact that the postmodern way of knowing has had on 
coextensive movements such as feminism, both in the academic and public spheres.  
Feminism in its current iteration rose to prominence with postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, and many leading feminist intellectuals of the late twentieth century 
were also philosophers, linguists, or literary theorists. Simone de Beauvoir, Judith Butler, 
and Julia Kristeva all stand out as pioneers of the intellectual sphere of contemporary 
feminism. In the public sphere, women such as Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem 
translated and applied the postmodern ideas of the more radical intellectual feminists into 
compelling calls to action with more mainstream appeal to the average woman. While it 
would be a challenge to prove a direct link between Betty Friedan’s efforts or Simone de 
Beauvoir’s ideas and Clive Bell’s theories on formalism or Picasso’s Cubism, the 
primary purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate the broader condition of society 
in which all of these thinkers, artists, and writers were working, and to provide concrete 
examples of this abstract condition so that it might be better understood when applied to a 
study of the feminist movement.  
Zerubavel’s insights are particularly useful in better understanding societal 
dynamics that are distinctly postmodern: in describing the modern (and postmodern) 
worldview, he explains, “A fuzzy-minded vision of the world is quite evident in the 
general modern aversion to conventional social divisions. Such an aversion is manifested 
in the movement towards racial desegregation, in the explicitly feminist effort to 
‘degenderize’ human relations, as well as in the relentless Marxist attempt to create a 
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classless society.”39 This description also helps to explain the connection between 
modern and postmodern art and the societal conditions they created: “Such an essentially 
fuzzy-minded view can also be seen in modern design, as evident from the modern 
fascination with glass, which basically blurs the fundamental distinction between inside 
and outside by allowing them to visually interpenetrate each other.”40 By understanding 
the difference in style and meaning between an eighteenth-century portrait by John 
Singleton Copley and a twentieth-century Picasso, and the cultural conditions under 
which these diametrically different styles came to be appreciated, one can gain an 
understanding of the broader cultural conditions under which leaders in other realms of 
twentieth century society were operating. In the following chapter, the link between these 
sweeping cultural conditions and the social and political movements they engendered will 
become evident in my discussion of feminist history and the development of the 
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Chapter Two 
A Brief History of American Feminism and Its Evolution Towards A Liberation 
from Essence Mindset 
Before delving into the political and social theories that underlie contemporary 
feminist discourse, it is first necessary to review the history and struggles of the feminist 
movement and the political context in which it arose. Having context in terms of the 
people, events, and ideas involved is vital if we are to effectively understand the 
movement from a theoretical standpoint. The second wave of feminism, beginning 
around 1960, is the movement that has come to dominate in the minds of most Americans 
and is responsible for the notions that occupy most American cultural and academic 
institutions. Legislative progress, in the form of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 with its Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination in hiring and 
promotion, laid the groundwork for a late twentieth century feminist revival.41 Betty 
Friedan, a Smith graduate and frustrated housewife herself, capitalized on the turning 
tides by identifying discrimination and a dearth of opportunities for women as the source 
of the frustration in her life and in the lives of many other educated, middle-class wives 
and mothers. Friedan successfully published The Feminine Mystique in 1963 to a 
receptive audience of other frustrated housewives, going on to found the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) with the goal of eliminating discrimination against 
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women. NOW featured women from across the political spectrum, including women of 
both political parties who had lead the efforts to pass the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.42  
However, the movement began to face significant challenges when the Equal 
Rights Amendment (ERA) was re-introduced. Prominent feminist and leader of the 
National Women’s Party (NWP), Alice Paul, first introduced the ERA to Congress in 
1923. The impetus for introducing such an amendment arose shortly after the 19th 
amendment, prohibiting any United States citizen from being denied the right to vote on 
the basis of sex, was passed in August of 1920. Paul and her fellow NWP members felt 
compelled to find a new issue to address after they had accomplished their initial goals, 
so shortly after the 19th amendment was ratified, “the NWP began planning a large 
convention at which its members would decide whether to continue as a group, and, if so, 
what to work for.”43 When the convention was held six months later, chairman Alice Paul 
ignored other suggestions and fully endorsed “an ongoing program to ‘remove all 
remaining forms of the subjection of women,’ by means of elimination of sex 
discrimination in law.” 44  The ERA was immediately a source of contention and 
disagreement not only between feminists and anti-feminists, but also within feminist 
groups. The amendment, which states “Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex,” was deemed 
particularly threatening to unions and blue collar workers.   	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 In response to the perceived threat, significant opposition to the amendment arose 
as early as 1922, when the National Consumer’s League, the League of Women Voters, 
and the Women’s Trade Union League all went on record “opposing ‘blanket’ equal 
rights bills, as the NWP formulations at both the state and federal levels were called.”45 
These critics’ concerns - that a constitutional amendment of this sort was “too 
undiscriminating an instrument” and that “objectionable sex discriminations such as those 
concerning jury duty, inheritance rights, nationality, or child custody would be more 
efficiently and accurately eliminated by specific bills for specific instances” - were 
significant and not without merit.46 Not surprisingly, similar sentiments arose once again 
when the second wave feminists attempted to re-introduce the ERA several decades later. 
By 1971, the ERA had passed the House with an almost unanimous vote, and by 
March 1972 it had passed in the Senate by a vote of 84-8.47 Soon, dozens of states began 
to ratify the ERA, in the midst of little opposition from politicians or the press. However, 
as with the first attempt to ratify the amendment, there were prominent critics, and Phyllis 
Schlafly, a conservative Catholic mother, wife, and lawyer, was at the helm of the anti-
ERA movement. Schlafly took up the anti-ERA cause after casually reading some 
materials on the amendment as well as various legal arguments against it, ultimately 
leading one of the most notorious and successful campaigns in recent political history.  
One of the crucial errors of the pro-ERA movement, both in the 1920s and again 
in the 1960s and 1970s, was a focus on women as a singular group who would perceive 	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their interests as solely tied to their gender: “The NWP posited that women could and 
would perceive self-interest in ‘purely’ gender terms. Faced by female opponents, its 
leaders imagined a fictive or abstract unity among women rather than attempt to 
encompass women’s real diversity.”48 In contrast, the opposition movements in both 
instances saw an opportunity gain more mainstream appeal. Phyllis Schlafly saw in the 
ERA revival the same dynamic at work again, and was able to craft a movement that 
mimicked the anti-ERA efforts of the 1920s by looking “at women as members of 
families - daughters, wives, mothers, and widows with family responsibilities” and 
recognizing that the “promise of ‘mere equality’ did not sufficiently take those 
relationships into account.”49   
However, Schlafly’s concerns were not solely related to women’s equality, racial, 
or labor issues, as was the case in the 1920s. Instead, she noted the many measures 
already taken to promote women’s equality, including the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and 
countless court victories.50 Schlafly was concerned about the subtler, underlying potential 
purposes of the ERA to actually cause harm to women and to radically change social and 
cultural mores. She saw it as “a blueprint for a radically new society,” according to 
Christina Hoff Sommers.51 Schlafly’s peers, such as Betty Friedan, were highly critical of 
women in the domestic sphere, going so far as to “attack a postwar culture that consigned 
women to the domestic sphere,” also attacking “the domestic sphere itself and the women 	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who chose to live there.”52 Schlafly was able to gain traction with her anti-ERA argument 
by pointing out that many women’s rights issues had already been addressed through 
previous legislation. While she seemingly had no qualms with these previous efforts, she 
saw something different about the ERA effort: something much more radical that would 
be overlooked by the majority of politicians, who were not going to object to an 
otherwise innocuous amendment that would surely score them political points among a 
key constituency.  
These issues came to light when Schlafly debated NOW representative Ann Scott 
on William F. Buckley Jr.’s television show Firing Line. In the debate, Schlafly laid out 
her claims: that “the ERA was not about women’s rights, but imposing an eccentric 
agenda on an unsuspecting nation.”53 She cited the possibility that the amendment could 
be used to require state-funded abortion, elimination of all forms of “gender segregation,” 
such as single-sex schools, and that women could be subject to the draft. While Buckley 
expected Ann Scott to refute Schlafly’s points, she instead agreed with them and declared 
that they were good things, claiming, “There is no question that if the ERA is passed 
women would become subject to the draft….If women are to be citizens, and citizens are 
to be subject to the draft, then women should take the responsibilities as well as the rights 
of citizenship.”54 It was clear from this debate that the NOW-driven ERA campaign was 
not quite as moderate as they had made it seem – and perhaps there was a shred of truth 
in Schlafly’s so-called extremist protests.  	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As Hoff Sommers writes, “Schlafly was certain that members of Congress and 
state legislatures had not meant to ratify Betty Freidan’s angry worldview or NOW’s 
increasingly radical agenda. She saw clearly that the amendment could be used in ways 
never dreamed of by its congressional supporters. The goal was radical egalitarianism.”55 
While Schlafly was highly successful in her anti-ERA efforts - by highlighting the 
controversial and contentious aspects of the ERA movement, she drew out the 
increasingly radical arguments of NOW and other ERA supporters and ultimately halted 
the passage of the amendment - the radical feminists were not willing to give up.56  
Not surprisingly, those in the pro-ERA group were not pleased to have someone 
as effective as Schlafly working against their cause. They viewed her actions quite 
negatively and thought that Schlafly was only successful because “she reached out to 
vulnerable women and played brilliantly on cultural anxieties.”57 To this day, Schlafly 
remains vilified by feminists for her anti-ERA efforts and right-wing views. One recent 
Jezebel headline read, “Phyllis Schlafly is Still a Cranky Asshole Who Doesn’t Get It,” 
and the article went on to heavily criticize one of her most recent books.58 Even more 
prominently, and indicative of the depth of negative sentiment harbored against Schlafly, 
feminist students and faculty at Washington University in St. Louis, Schlafly’s alma 
mater, launched a nation-wide protest against the university’s decision to bestow an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, 55. 
57 Sara Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End, (New 
York: Free Press, 2003), 113. 
58 Tracie Egan Morrissey, “Phyllis Schlafly is Still A Cranky Asshole Who Doesn’t Get 
It,” Jezebel, February 23, 2011.  
http://jezebel.com/5768299/phyllis-schlafly-is-still-a-cranky-asshole-who-doesnt-get-it 	  
	   32	  
Honorary Doctorate upon her in 2008. The director of the school’s Women’s and Gender 
Studies program, Mary Ann Dzuback, spoke for many of Schlafly’s critics, claiming, 
“The university has completely disregarded the concerns about anybody who cares about 
full and equal rights for women, who cares about the intellectual quality of feminist 
debate, and who cares about women's desire to enter the work force.”59  Clearly, 
Schlafly’s impact on political discourse and her role in halting feminist efforts should not 
be underestimated, especially as a force for galvanizing the feminist movement in the 
aftermath of the failure of the ERA. 
 Though the campaign ended by the summer of 1982, the second wave of feminist 
ideology and its movement for “radical egalitarianism” was far from dead: the failure of 
the ERA helped to create an environment in which “the zeal of feminists was fed in equal 
parts by their optimism that an egalitarian world was possible and by the hostility and 
derision they met at every turn.”60  As Hoff Sommers explains via historian Jane 
Mansbridge, “by the mid-seventies most feminist leaders held that ‘the ERA would 
require the military to send women draftees into combat on the same basis as men.’ They 
did so, she says, ‘because their ideology called for full equality with men, not for equality 
with exceptions.’”61 In response to the failure of the ERA, the feminist movement 
became increasingly focused on complete and total equality as the highest moral good, 
without regard for other considerations, such as what type of society or culture would 	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result if any causes of inequality in any realm - whether natural or artificial - were 
eliminated. Instead of asking why so many men and women were put off by the ERA’s 
potential uses, or why so many people do not identify as feminists, the leaders of the 
feminist movement, in both the public sphere and in academia, have simply turned to 
increasingly convoluted and radical explanations for their observations and grievances.  
This response, beginning with second wave feminism in the 1960s and evolving 
into third wave feminism throughout the late 1980s to the present, defines freedom as 
liberation from essence in a uniquely postmodern way. This more radical turn was in part 
made out of necessity: if the majority of women do not want radical egalitarianism and 
legislation such as the ERA, then surely there must be some larger social force at work, 
something that is keeping the masses from seeing the light. If women do not respond to 
the call for “liberation,” then the more pressing underlying issues, whatever they are, 
must be addressed: as Sara Evans explains, “Many New Left activists came to believe 
that American society was not salvageable and required a total transformation.”62  
 In the midst of this shift, the feminist climate became increasingly intolerant to 
any dissent. In her book on the history of modern feminism, Evans characterized the shift 
as a “search for purity” and for a “‘true’ feminism in the realm of ideas and the formula 
for a perfectly realized feminist life. The pursuit of perfection made it difficult to 
entertain complexity, sliding easily into dogmatism. Differences of opinion and lifestyle 
betrayed the “true faith” and could not be tolerated.”63 There are countless examples of 
this type of rhetoric - which I would categorize as “liberation from essence” feminism - 	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revealing the abstract and radical notions that were increasingly influencing the 
mainstream feminist movement. 
 In an excerpt from her personal diary, published in Conflicts in Feminism, Ann 
Snitow expresses her hopes that the feminist movement would allow her to escape from 
womanhood. In one instance, she recalls a conversation in which one of her friends asked 
“How can someone who doesn’t like being a woman be a feminist?” to which Snitow 
replied, “Why would anyone who likes being a woman need to be a feminist?”64 She 
continues, expressing in joyful and almost histrionic terms, her realization that “Now I 
don’t have to be a woman anymore. I need never become a mother. Being a woman has 
always been humiliating, but I used to assume there was no exit. Now the very idea of 
‘woman’ is up for grabs. ‘Woman’ is my slave name; feminism will give me freedom to 
seek some other identity altogether.”65 The views of Snitow and her peers represent the 
most poignant and extreme examples of the feminist liberation from essence thought. 
Clearly, Snitow’s version of feminism goes beyond a desire for equal-pay laws or the 
right to vote - she equates her freedom with liberation not only from active 
discrimination, but also from any biological or cultural expectations or restrictions.  
 It is not surprising that such a view would also enable one to argue that it is not 
only possible but that it would be ideal “for the biological difference to wither away as a 
basis for social organization, either by moving men and women toward some shared 
center (androgyny) or toward some experience of human variety in which biology is but 	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one small variable.” 66 It should be noted that underlying the liberation from essence 
mindset is the commonly accepted social scientific view that many behaviors and 
institutions are socially constructed. This belief and its incorporation into feminist 
thought is perhaps derived from one of the earliest feminist thinkers, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, who wrote one of the founding books of feminism in 1792, A Vindication 
of the Rights of Women, in which “she said what was new then and remains fresh, 
shocking, and doubtful to many now: that sex hierarchy - like ranks in the church and the 
army or like the then newly contested ascendancy of kings - was social, not natural.”67 
However, those embracing the liberation from essence view seem to take deconstruction 
a step further. In conceiving of gender roles and even gender as socially constructed, 
feminists such as Snitow can easily follow these ideas to their extremes and make the 
case for liberation from essence - if gender is not a real and absolute category, then there 
is no way to defend it, let alone impose specific gender rules and expectations on all 
human beings.  
 Simone de Beauvoir explored these ideas, rather controversially and with 
immense impact on feminist and postmodern thinking, in The Second Sex, published in 
1948 in France and translated into English for American readers in 1952. It is difficult to 
do Beauvoir justice here, as the book is 700 pages long and but one of her many works, 
but there are countless examples in her work that reflect the liberation from essence 
mindset within feminist thought. She is famous for her line, “One is not born, but rather 
becomes, a woman,” and similar sentiments are found throughout The Second Sex: 	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In the end woman escapes the iron grasp of the species by way of 
still another serious crisis; the phenomena of menopause, the 
inverse of puberty…woman is now delivered from the servitude 
imposed by her female nature…And what is more, she is no longer 
the prey of overwhelming forces; she is herself, she and her body 
are one. It is sometimes said that women of a certain age constitute 
a ‘third sex,’ and in truth while they are not males, they are no 
longer females. Often, indeed, this release from female physiology 
is expressed in a health, a balance, a vigor that they lacked 
before.68  
 
Here, Beauvoir demonizes women’s reproductive capabilities, describing them as 
harmful and as rendering women “servants” to their nature, and glorifies the experiences 
of women who are liberated from their biological reproductive capabilities and 
obligations. It is important to note here that Beauvoir, like Snitow, is not simply arguing 
for better maternity leave policies or government-subsidized day care programs to ease 
the burdens of working mothers; rather, she is positing an ideal in which women are not 
mothers at all, and construes the biologically-driven female experience as inherently 
discriminatory and harmful to women.  
 Such extreme and negative views about female biology and womanhood abound 
in feminist thought, and often posit a movement towards cultural, if not biological, 
androgyny, as a solution to the problem of gender. As Carolyn Heilbrun writes,  
I believe that our future salvation lies in a movement away from 
sexual polarization and the prison of gender toward a world in 
which individual roles and the modes of personal behavior can be 
freely chosen. The ideal toward which I believe we should move is 
best described by the term ‘androgyny.’ Androgyny seeks to 
liberate the individual from the confines of the appropriate.69  
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We see here again a reiteration of the belief that any traditional expectations or rules of 
propriety are merely constructed and function primarily as tools of oppression. The 
highest moral good in this world view is one in which individuals are encouraged and 
able to subjectively choose their identities and roles without regard for any purposes or 
systems outside of their own liberation and fulfillment. Heilbrun continues, “Androgyny 
suggests…a full range of experience open to individuals who may, as women, be 
aggressive, as men, tender; it suggests a spectrum upon which human beings choose their 
places without regard to propriety or custom.”70 Susan Okin also goes so far as to claim 
that, “A just future would be one without gender. In its social structures and practices, 
one’s sex would have no more relevance than one’s eye color or the length of one’s toes,” 
reflecting the liberal ideal that one’s choices and autonomy should play a larger role in 
one’s identity than any predetermined genders or cultural roles. In envisioning such a 
gender-less future, however, Okin imagines one in which androgyny eliminates 
traditional biological and cultural expectations pertaining to childbirth or raising children: 
“No assumptions would be made about ‘male’ and ‘female’ roles; childbearing would 
be…conceptually separated from child rearing and other family responsibilities…”71 
The views of feminist icon Shulamith Firestone are also revealing of the liberation 
from essence ideology and its place in the feminist movement. Firestone was a major 
leader in second and third wave radical feminism, and her ideas still have influence 
today. Firestone was adamant about the dangers of the traditional family structure - ideas 	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that are reminiscent of Marxist collectivism. While these ideas are clearly quite radical, 
they represent the line of thinking that shapes poststructuralist feminist thought. In 
writing on the relationship between biological constraints and the exploitation of women, 
Firestone claims, “Unless revolution uproots the basic social organization, the biological 
family - the vinculum through which the psychology of power can always be smuggled - 
the tapeworm of exploitation will never be annihilated,” going so far as to claim that 
“pregnancy is barbaric.” 72  Here, Firestone is blatantly retaliating not only against 
feminine essence, but also against any sort of essence. It appears that she makes this 
connection specifically to essential characteristics assigned by society based on biological 
differences - an issue that is later on addressed by thinkers such as Julia Kristeva and 
Judith Butler. Firestone went on to demand that, “The end goal of feminist revolution 
must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of 
male privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital difference between human beings 
would no longer matter culturally.”73 It should be noted here that Firestone clearly thinks 
that identity differences, especially those based on biological differences, are socially 
constructed and subjective and prevent the formation of a totally equal society, which 
aligns closely with poststructuralist, egalitarian feminist views. 
The rhetoric of the liberation from essence feminists exemplified here is 
damaging not only because of its misguided and unbalanced views on social and cultural 
values, but also because its propagators are convinced that they are right and that those 	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who disagree must be disposed of or silenced. In Zerubavel’s terms, the liberation from 
essence feminists are a thought community convinced that their views and ideas are 
“social facts.” That these lines of thinking have become so prevalent and powerful in 
public and academic discourse is cause for concern, and I illustrate this phenomenon 
through further analysis of different schools of contemporary feminist thought and 
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Chapter Three 
Flaws of Liberation from Essence Feminism in the Academic Sphere 
THEORETICAL FLAWS 
Christina Hoff Sommers: Freedom Feminism and Maternal Feminism 
Philosopher and “dissident” feminist Christina Hoff Sommers has attempted to 
address some of the common conservative-leaning concerns with the feminist movement 
in her recent book, Freedom Feminism. Hoff Sommers has been highly criticized by 
mainstream feminists, primarily because of her defense of men and boys in response to 
what she perceives as unjust and discriminatory stereotypes and policies promoted by 
feminist and liberal thinkers and policymakers. Both Hoff Sommers’ work and her 
experience as part of the feminist movement provide insight on this topic, and I will 
examine her experiences as a dissident feminist in a case study in the next chapter.   
 She highlights in the beginning of the book that most Americans, including 70% 
of women, say, “no” when asked, “Are you a feminist?” What is it about feminism that 
makes American men and women skeptical? Hoff Sommers identifies the problem 
partially as a uniquely American preoccupation with the plight of women in developed 
nations with little regard for the considerably worse circumstances of most women in 
other parts of the world. She cites feminist playwright Eve Ensler, who claimed during a 
2003 lecture at Harvard, “I think that the oppression of women is universal. We are 
bonded in every single place of the world. I think the conditions are exactly the 
same…the systematic global oppression of women is completely across the globe.”74 She 	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also mentions prominent feminist blogger Jessica Valenti, who claims, “We have no 
problem condemning atrocities done to women abroad, yet too many of us in the United 
States ignore the oppression on our doorstep. We’re suffering under the mass delusion 
that women in America have achieved equality…Part of this unwillingness to see 
misogyny in America could be self-protection - perhaps the truth is too scary to face.”75 
Hoff Sommers claims that it is prominent feminist leaders such as Valenti and Ensler 
who are responsible for the American public’s distaste for the term, by exaggerating the 
supposed suffering of Americans and dismissing in some ways the far worse struggles of 
women elsewhere. These views do not appeal to the average American woman, who 
likely would not see herself as “suffering under a mass delusion.” 
However, Hoff Sommers also sees an opportunity to “reclaim” feminism by 
acknowledging its tremendous progress, especially in the United States, and by offering 
less radical and more common sense reasons to maintain a feminist movement. In doing 
so, she claims it is vital to understand how to preserve the freedom and equality that has 
been achieved, how to assist feminist leaders in other parts of the world, and to continue 
to address legitimate instances of violence and discrimination against women, even in the 
United States.76 She conceptualizes her style of feminism “freedom feminism,” which 
stands for “the moral, social, and legal equality of the sexes” and “the freedom of women 
to employ their equal status to pursue happiness in their own distinctive ways.”77 Hoff 
Sommers distinguishes freedom feminism from other schools of feminist thought by 	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emphasizing that it embraces masculinity and femininity, is not anti-capitalism, and does 
not view men’s happiness and women’s happiness as a zero-sum-game.78 From this 
description, freedom feminism does not sound too controversial – it seems to strike a 
middle ground in a way that would appeal to most people, including both men and 
women. Also accurately described as equity feminism, Hoff Sommers’ theory is 
fundamentally classical liberal in its principles, and might appeal to a more libertarian-
minded person who values primarily negative liberties and encourages individuals to 
make their own informed choices, regardless of whether or not they agree with the 
choice. 
Hoff Sommers also spends time defining her concept of a “maternal feminist,” a 
more traditional form of feminism, influential in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Hoff Sommers laments the fact that Hannah More, who she sees as the founder 
of maternal feminism, has been all but forgotten by contemporary feminists and 
historians. As Hoff Sommers writes, “More initiated a humane revolution in the relations 
of the sexes that was decorous, civilized, and socially cohesive. Above all, it was a 
feminism that women themselves could comfortably embrace: a feminism that 
empowered and freed women on their own terms. Indeed if More’s name and fame had 
not been airbrushed out of contemporary women’s history, many today might identify 
with a modernized version of her female-friendly feminism.”79 So why have hardly any 
modern Americans heard of Hannah More, let alone embraced her form of feminism? 
According to Anne Mellor, a UCLA literary scholar, “many of the leading scholars who 	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specialize on the eighteenth and nineteenth century are committed to ‘left-wing social 
ideologies,’” causing them to “hate Hannah More because in their eyes she did far too 
much to stop a liberating-French style of political revolution occurring in England.”80 
Hoff Sommers cites Marxist social historian E.P. Thompson as an example: Thompson 
“accused More of fear mongering and brainwashing the working class.”81 She also cites 
literary scholar Elizabeth Kowaleski-Wallace, representative of modern feminist 
theorists, who described More “as a case study of ‘patriarchal complicity’ and an 
‘uninvited guest’ who ‘makes the process of celebrating our heritage as women more 
difficult.’”82 This type of attitude displayed by contemporary feminists towards women 
who promote femininity and who express a desire to work within the existing system is 
also quite visible in the public sphere, and will be more closely examined in the case 
study section.  
Linda Alcoff: Cultural Feminism and Poststructuralist Feminism 
 Feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff has also identified a sort of identity crisis 
within contemporary feminist thought. She approaches the issue from the standpoint of 
the logical cohesion (or lack thereof) within the actual philosophies underlying feminist 
ideas. Alcoff sees the essence issue, and the way feminists approach it, as the primary 
source of feminism’s problem. She is more charitable to the more progressive feminist 
ideas than Hoff Sommers, however, and in her work attempts to both define and to 
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mediate between what she identifies as the two primary schools of postmodern feminist 
thought: cultural feminism and poststructuralist feminism.  
Cultural feminism at first glance seems vaguely familiar to Hoff Sommers’ 
maternal feminism, but its underlying ideas are far more radical. For Alcoff, “the concept 
of woman” - and what her essence may be - is the central issue: “It is the central concept 
for feminists because the concept and category of woman is the necessary point of 
departure for any feminist theory and feminist politics…[but] the dilemma facing 
feminist theorists today is that our very self-definition is grounded in a concept that we 
must deconstruct and de-essentialize in all of its aspects.”83 Alcoff’s reasoning behind 
this is that, in order to advocate on the behalf of women and to promote the idea of and 
need for feminism, there must be some understanding or definition of what a woman is; 
however, any attempt to define a woman is undermined by the male-dominated discourse 
and culture which has constructed the idea of “woman” in its own biased way.  
 The two primary responses to this issue have been to either claim that feminists 
and women “have the exclusive right to describe and evaluate women,” or to “reject the 
possibility of defining woman as such at all.”84 The first response is what Alcoff calls 
cultural feminism, which argues that the primary issue facing women is that they have let 
men define them for so long. However, underlying this belief is that men and women 
have opposing views and interests, and that the process of defining a woman or man can 	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be reduced to a zero sum game in which each gender must fight for itself or suffer at the 
hands of the other.85 The second response, which Alcoff labels poststructuralist feminism, 
is rooted in the linguistic and philosophical idea that everything can be “deconstructed,” 
and that any attempts to define a woman, whether by a feminist or a man or a misogynist, 
are “politically reactionary and ontologically mistaken.”86  
This notion, rooted in French poststructuralist theory, allows these feminists to 
claim “that such errors occur because we are in fundamental ways duplicating misogynist 
strategies when we try to define women, characterize women, or speak for women, even 
though allowing for a range of differences within the gender. The politics of gender or 
sexual difference must be replaced with a plurality of difference where gender loses its 
position of significance.”87 This view effectively eliminates the idea of gender altogether, 
especially as a defining or meaningful characteristic, and thus paradoxically undermines 
the need for a feminist movement in the first place. As Alcoff readily acknowledges, both 
responses are seriously problematic, as “transcending these limitations while retaining the 
theoretical framework from which they emerge is impossible.”88 
The cultural feminist view does, to some extent, acknowledge the more 
mainstream belief that femaleness and femininity can be tied to women’s specifically 
female anatomy and biological capabilities. Alcoff references feminist Mary Daly, for 
whom “Women's identification as female is their defining essence…their haecceity, 
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‘The key point remains that it is our specifically female anatomy that is the primary 
constituent of our identity and the source of our female essence.’”89 However, cultural 
feminism is more radical in its embrace of women’s liberation as a counter culture to the 
status quo and to male culture. One of Alcoff’s sources, Ann Echols, “identifies cultural 
feminist writings by their denigration of masculinity rather than male roles or practices, 
by the valorization of female traits, and by their commitment to preserve rather than 
diminish gender differences.”90 This mindset seems to set men and women at odds, rather 
than seeking solutions that are friendly to all human interests. 
However, Echols is also critical of cultural feminism because its “preoccupation 
with defining the female sensibility not only leads these feminists to indulge in 
dangerously erroneous generalizations about women, but to imply that this identity is 
innate rather than socially constructed.” 91 One of the counterarguments to those who 
attempt to explain everything through deconstruction, articulated by Janice Raymond, is 
that “there are differences, and some feminists have come to realize that those differences 
are important whether they spring from socialization, from biology, or from the total 
history of existing as a woman in a patriarchal society.”92 This point echoes those of 
many right-leaning feminists, especially Hoff Sommers and Schlafly, who wonder, if the 
feminist issues are really so serious and so applicable to the lives of most women, then 
why do so many people, including women, reject them? Some aspects of cultural 
feminism do seem quite reasonable. Alcoff asks, “After a decade of hearing liberal 	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feminists advising us to wear business suits and enter the male world, it is a helpful 
corrective to have cultural feminists argue instead that women’s world is full of superior 
virtues and values, to be credited and learned from rather than despised.”93 
  In attempting to expound upon the thinking behind poststructuralist feminism, 
Alcoff explains, “The mechanism of power referred to here is the construction of the 
subject by a discourse that weaves knowledge and power into a coercive structure…on 
this view, essentialist formulations of womanhood, even when made by feminists, ‘tie’ 
the individual to her identity as a woman and thus cannot represent a solution to 
sexism.”94 The problem with this view, when it is applied to social and political 
movements, is that it places the individual’s ability and desire to subjectively create and 
design their own identity and purpose as the highest moral good - there is not higher 
order or meaning beyond what the individual creates as part of their autonomous and 
non-essential identity. As Alcoff explains, “The political struggle can have only a 
‘negative function:’ rejecting ‘everything finite, definite, structured, loaded with 
meaning, in the existing state of society.’”95 Such a view might be helpful when 
addressing individual psychological or social difficulties, but it is a problematic way to 
lead a social movement and a destructive way to lead people in understanding their role 
in a social, humane world. Alcoff’s criticism is rooted in the philosophically challenging 
aspect of such a view: “Applied to the concept of woman the poststructuralist’s view 
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results in what I shall call nominalism: the idea that the category of ‘woman’ is a fiction 
and that feminist efforts must be directed toward dismantling this fiction.”96 
Alcoff explains that the appeal of post-structuralism to feminist thinkers is two-
fold: “First, it seems to hold out the promise of an increased freedom for women, the 
‘free play’ of a plurality of differences unhampered by any predetermined gender identity 
as formulated by either patriarchy or cultural feminism. Second, it moves decisively 
beyond cultural feminism and liberal feminism in further theorizing what they leave 
untouched: the construction of subjectivity.”97 Interestingly, Alcoff notes the extent to 
which poststructuralist feminism is a direct descendent of classical liberal views on the 
individual: “Despite rumblings from the Continent, Anglo-American thought is still 
wedded to the ideal of a universalizable, apolitical methodology and set of transhistorical 
basic truths unfettered by associations with particular genders, races, classes, or 
cultures.”98 Alcoff sees the generic human idea, promoted in Enlightenment thinking, as 
closely related to post-structuralism’s designation of “individual particularities such as 
subjective experience as a social construct,” and claims that “post-structuralism’s 
negation of the authority of the subject coincides nicely with the classical liberal’s view 
that human particularities are irrelevant. (For the liberal, race, class, and gender are 
ultimately irrelevant to questions of justice and truth because ‘underneath we are all the 
same.’)” Perhaps Alcoff’s most relevant and pressing question is the one that points to 
the primary problem facing any proponent of poststructuralist feminism: “A feminist 	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adoption of nominalism will be confronted with the same problem theories of ideology 
have, that is, Why is a right-wing woman’s consciousness constructed via social 
discourse but a feminist’s consciousness is not?”99 
It has been recognized by many feminists in academia that disagreements among 
feminists are cause for concern, especially those who wish to see feminist ideas of any 
form succeed.  The editors of Conflicts in Feminism note in their introduction that,  
While feminists have in principle tended to agree that difference is 
a more productive theoretical and political category than either 
universalizing consensus or divisive oppositions, in practice, actual 
differences within feminist discourse have tended to erupt into 
separate camps. At this moment in time, some of these conflicts 
have proven so divisive that they seem to foreclose rather than 
stimulate debate, even at times appearing to threaten the very 
viability of contemporary feminism as a political and theoretical 
venture.100 
 
The problems that result from such a stifling intellectual climate are apparent not only to 
those dealing with feminism in theory, but also among those putting it into practice in the 
classroom or in the public sphere.  
The editors of Conflicts in Feminism also echo Alcoff’s observation that “A 
common divide keeps forming in both feminist thought and action between the need to 
build the identity ‘woman’ and give it solid political meaning and the need to tear down 
the very category ‘woman’ and dismantle its all-too-solid history.”101 They recognize that 
neither approach is without fault: social construction does not seem plausible to the 
average person, and “to assert that the body has no enduring, natural language often 	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seems like a rejection of common sense.”102 Not only is it a tough sell to a mainstream 
audience, but also the poststructuralist approach is logically problematic, in that “By 
definition social construction theory cannot offer a securely bounded area for the study of 
gender; instead it initiates an inspiring collapse of gender verities.”103 Alcoff offers a 
similar sentiment, asking, “If gender is simply a social construct, the need and even the 
possibility of a feminist politics becomes immediately problematic. What can we demand 
in the name of women if ‘women’ do not exist and demands in their name simply 
reinforce the myth that they do?”104 Such an approach eventually leads to an almost 
nihilistic nothingness - a void in which there is no need for women’s liberation because 
women do not exist. 
The editors also touch on an important dichotomy in feminist thought, somewhat 
analogous to Alcoff’s cultural feminism and poststructuralist feminism:  
Equality and difference are broad ideas and have included a rrange 
of definitions and political expressions. Equality, for example, can 
mean anything from the mildest liberal reform to the most radical 
reduction of gender to insignificance. Difference can mean 
anything from Mary Daly’s belief in the natural superiority of 
women to psychoanalytic theories of how women are inevitably 
cast as “the Other” because they lack penises.105 
 
Clearly, even within two polarized categories - equality and difference feminism - there 
are still more opportunities for polarization and disagreement. 
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It is clear from Alcoff’s essay and from the essays in Conflicts in Feminism that 
this issue is deeply troubling for feminists who are committed to an academic and 
logically sound feminism that is rooted in reality:  
A subjectivity that is fundamentally shaped by gender appears to 
lead irrevocably to essentialism, the posing of a male/female 
opposition as universal and ahistorical. A subjectivity that is not 
fundamentally shaped by gender appears to lead to the conception 
of a generic human subject, as if we could peel away our ‘cultural’ 
layers and get to the real root of human nature, which turns out to 
be genderless. Are these really our only choices?106 
 
I argue that they are not the only choices, and that both cultural feminism and 
poststructuralist feminism adhere to and even depend fundamentally on an underlying 
and flawed liberation from essence view.  
The problem with the liberation from essence view, as it is found in both cultural 
feminism and poststructuralist feminism, is that, in dealing with issues of broader social 
and political relevance, it ultimately places the individual’s autonomy and subjectivity as 
the highest moral good. Whether it follows the cultural feminist line of thinking, which 
views women’s interests and men’s interests in opposition to each other and does not 
presuppose or allow for any mutual interests or synergy beyond the individual woman or 
man’s happiness, or the poststructuralist feminist’s view of denying the category of 
“woman” in the first place, neither view takes larger societal goods into consideration. 
Neither view considers a purpose outside of the individual’s own identity, self-definition 
in relation to community or tradition, and subjective experience in the world.  
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While such views may have value in a therapeutic or psychological setting, they 
are destructive ways to view social interactions and to interpret one’s role in society and 
relationships and duties to others. Cultural feminism sees masculinity and femininity as 
“at war,” and can be traced to the type of matriarchal feminism promoted by Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, while poststructuralist feminism faces serious logical inconsistencies 
that threaten to eliminate the notion of women in the first place. Hoff Sommers’ offers a 
more classical liberal and moderate feminism centered on freedom and individual 
liberties. Thus, we have three primary schools of feminist thought to consider. There are 
the two that are accepted on the left: poststructuralist feminism and cultural (matriarchal) 
feminism. Then there is the more right leaning blend of freedom and maternal feminism 
promoted by Hoff Sommers. This chapter has identified the difficulties that contemporary 
feminists face in attempting to develop an underlying philosophical impetus for the 
movement; next I will consider how they are addressing feminism as an academic 
discipline with a role in educational institutions.  
PEDAGOGICAL FLAWS 
In Professing Feminism: Cautionary Tales from the Strange World of Women’s 
Studies, by Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge, there is a plethora of background and 
information on the status of Women’s Studies as an academic discipline and the role of 
feminism in the academic sphere. The authors faced much backlash in writing the book - 
which in some ways amounts to an expose - yet what they are arguing seems entirely 
reasonable. One of the major issues that concerned them is feminism and Women’s 
Studies’ inability to effectively respond to criticism. Instead, the common response is to 
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try to silence the opponent and shut down critical discussion of the issue. This dismays 
the authors, who rightly ask, “After all does feminism itself not counsel women to refuse 
to be silenced by coercive ideological systems? Does feminism not tell us to criticize and 
dismantle traditions and institutions that harm women by impeding their development in 
all spheres, including - we would say, especially - the intellectual and moral?”107 This 
statement speaks to their concern about feminism’s influence not only on academic and 
intellectual work but also on individuals and the larger culture in which they live.  
While feminism as it is taught in Women’s Studies courses may cater to those 
who for various personal, psychological, or political reasons are attracted to certain 
ideologies, it does not in its current form emphasize the importance of intellectual and 
moral development - unlike many other academic disciplines, it seems to distinctly lack 
intellectual diversity or pluralism. Both authors themselves had taught in Women’s 
Studies departments until they found that they were not ideal situations for a true 
intellectual: Patai and Koertge refer to “the ideological policing and intolerance” that 
permeates feminist circles, especially in academia, with much concern.108 
In their research, they interview “‘exiles’ from Women’s Studies - colleagues who 
still considered themselves to be feminists and whose work and lives have been deeply 
marked by feminism, but who or one reason or another had withdrawn to other 
departments or were contemplating such a move.” Their findings ranged from complaints 
about improper academic procedures to tyrannical decision making to bullying and 	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militant behavior by both colleagues and students. Many of the interviewees actually 
feared the extent to which their departments were indoctrinating students and lamented 
the degree to which classrooms felt more like “twelve-step programs or group therapy 
sessions.”109  Recognizing that feminists faced immense challenges in establishing a new 
academic field, and especially one that was so heavily criticized and resented, Patai and 
Koertge trace the problem in Women’s Studies to two root causes: academic separatism 
and a deference to political activism.110 They describe the process as one in which a 
“sense of vulnerability contributed to the development of a siege mentality.”111  
The problem with this mentality is that Women’s Studies programs began to see 
themselves  
…as a site of correct political action and therefore promoted not 
independent inquiry but adherence to a particular line of analysis 
and to the activities that follow from it. In such cases - as we find 
in some Women’s Studies programs that attempt to minimize the 
difference between themselves and groups engaged in feminist 
activism outside the university - educational aims are made 
entirely subordinate to political goals.112  
 
This means that students and faculty do not engage in critical debate over political and 
feminist issues, and that there is little emphasis on factual information, supporting claims 
with data, or being able to reflect on one’s work and ideas in a dispassionate way. 
Everything is personalized, and students are taught to agree with what everyone else is 
saying or to just not say anything at all. As the authors explain, “From a feminist 
pedagogical perspective, there are two ways to resolve the conflict that occurs when 	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people make opposing claims. One can say that each person has her own perspective and 
all opinions are equally valid (a standard move in family therapy), or one can give 
preference to the opinion of the person who is most oppressed. Critical discussion 
becomes difficult, if not impossible, in either circumstance.”113 
Many of the people interviewed by Patai and Koertge echo sentiments that are 
much more moderate and tolerant of women’s varying desires and ideals. In thinking 
about how to improve Women’s Studies as a discipline, one person offered the following:  
It would have to be an inclusive model. Before you get to the point 
of adding issues of race and ethnicity and religion and sexual 
preference and the disabled and all these other categories of 
difference, there has to be a respect for other people’s decisions to 
live certain kinds of lives, whether it’s to have children or not to 
have children, to be married to men or not to be married to men. 
These choices can’t be seen as excluding someone from being a 
thoroughgoing feminist in theory or in practice. And I think there 
was this problem of exclusion from the beginning.114  
 
The particular issue this person refers to - instances in which the powers that be deem 
some choices feminist and some choices unfeminist - is an unfortunate byproduct of 
postmodern feminism. This tendency is present both in the classroom, as Patai and 
Koertge point out, as well as in public discourse, as I will show in the upcoming case 
studies. Another disturbing phenomenon, which manifests itself in both pedagogical and 
public ways, is certain feminists’ tendency to see their ideology as immune to criticism: 
“Although Women’s Studies faculty worry about how to handle disbelieving ‘southern 
ladies,’ disruptive males, or unenlightened women students, they never take student 
resistance as a valid indication that there might indeed be something inappropriate about 	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what they are teaching or how they are teaching it.”115 This mindset - that feminists and 
feminism can not under any circumstances be criticized - is highly reminiscent of 
Zerubavel’s points about thought communities and the delusion of logical inevitably that 
a “true believer” of any ideology will hold.  
They also identify feminists’ adherence to the schools of thought described by 
Alcoff as part of the intellectual problem. These modern and highly abstract theories are 
rarely taught in the broader context of intellectual history or compared with other 
alternative ideologies or theories. As they explain, “The popularity of Marxism and the 
French version of psychoanalysis seems to be waning now, but cultural relativism, 
standpoint epistemology, social constructionism, theories of linguistic and cultural 
hegemony, and other progeny of postmodernism are alive and well in feminist 
classrooms, and are often uncritically embraced there.”116 These issues are all part of 
what John Ellis, author of Literature Lost: Social Agendas and the Corruption of the 
Humanities, describes as the “severe intellectual deterioration that has taken place” in the 
Women’s Studies discipline.117 Ellis unabashedly ties this supposed deterioration to the 
radical postmodern notions of constructionism embraced by certain feminists: 
No other academic program seems to have leaned so heavily and 
inventively on social constructionism as has Women’s Studies. 
The theoretical bedrock of the current wave of feminism is the 
claim that gender itself is socially constructed, and that different 
roles played by men and women in society, and the personality 
characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors ascribed to them, derive 	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largely from conventional social arrangements, which vary 
dramatically from culture to culture.118 
 
While Ellis clearly is not very sympathetic to the notion of social construction, his point - 
that an entire academic discipline has rooted itself in a highly specific and recently 
developed social theory - still stands and is worth noting. Willis also has observed more 
specifically the way feminism’s almost complete embrace of these ideas has harmed 
intellectual discourse in feminist circles: 
Under the influence of deconstruction, this crudity was not only 
permitted but encouraged as the deepest form of argument, and this 
is why feminists, for example, now think that they can brush aside 
objections simply by identifying a critic as sexist or conservative. 
In this way and others, deconstruction made matters easier for 
race-gender-class supporters by degrading the intellectual climate 
of the academy.119 
 
While Willis seems to generalize here in claiming all feminists resort to these unrefined 
approaches to intellectual dialogue, he is correct to point out the way the dominance of 
one particular school of thought - in this case, deconstruction - has enabled those who do 
not wish to engage in intellectually productive ways to get away with subpar arguments 
and unproductive interactions with others.  
 Patai and Koertge also note the insular and almost separatist nature of Women’s 
Studies as an academic discipline. Their suggestion for improving the visibility of and 
respect for feminist scholarship is for those involved to engage “in open dialogue with 
both male and non-feminist female scholars. Separatism unavoidably discourages such 	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dialogue. Instead, it favors dogmatic assertion, a standard tactic of ideologically inflamed 
movements, whether religious or political.”120 Zerubavel’s insights can help us to better 
understand the dynamics of an intellectual movement that has morphed into a movement 
with almost religious undertones. A feminist’s, or in this particular case, a liberation from 
essence feminist’s distinctive worldview is not something they developed by chance as an 
individual; “it is an impersonal outlook which they acquire through their membership in a 
particular professional community.” The process of gaining membership to such a 
community is what Zerubavel describes as “optical socialization,” typically taking place  
…within particular thought communities (a particular profession, a 
particular religion, a particular generation)…Such ‘optical’ 
traditions are not just random collections of ways of ‘seeing’ 
particular objects, but, rather, general, global worldviews…Such 
general outlooks typically affect the mental vision of entire 
‘optical’ communities and not just particular individuals within 
them, since they are available to practically everyone who wears 
the community’s distinctive mental lenses and thus commonly 
shared by all of its members.121  
 
Understanding the dynamics of these ideological thought communities - dynamics which 
occur as often in religious groups and conservative ideological thought communities as 
they do among those of their liberal and progressive counterparts - illuminates the danger 
in allowing such a community to dominate intellectual and public discourse, and to 
silence others in the name of its own supposed right-ness. As Zerubavel emphasizes so 
strongly, the key aspect to understand is that since “our mental horizons are for the most 
part neither natural nor logical,” it should be considered highly problematic if any 	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particular thought community asserts something to the contrary and is actively seeking to 
suppress further discussion or development of their ideas.122 In order to remain relevant 
as a respected academic discipline, it is imperative that feminists and those involved in 
Women’s Studies give due consideration to the issues raised by Patai, Koertge, Willis, 
and countless others. The problems identified by Patai and Koertge in particular suggest 
that feminism is more of a religious ideology than an intellectual school of thought, a 
substantive problem that must be addressed if feminists hope to continue to use academic 
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Chapter Four 
Case Studies of the Liberation from Essence Mentality in the Public Sphere 
The following case studies highlight several problematic aspects of the liberation 
from essence mindset, as it is present in public discourse. While the case studies are 
singular and specific incidents, they allow for in-depth examination of the way abstract 
feminist theories play out in public discourse and become visible outside the confines of 
academia. The goal in presenting these cases is not to demonize those who have engaged 
productively in the feminist marketplace of ideas and whose contributions have been 
inspiring and informative to a broad public audience. Rather, these case studies highlight 
specific behaviors by those who, whether intentionally or not, undermine the success and 
respectability of the feminist movement by promoting the flawed liberation from essence 
ideology in illiberal and anti-intellectual ways.  
It is helpful to use the case study approach in analyzing the liberation from 
essence mentality in the public sphere because it will allow for a thorough exploration of 
the modes of behavior and dynamics of the feminist marketplace of ideas as they occur in 
practice. My decision to use the case study approach is informed by sociologists Joe 
Feagin and Anthony Orum’s A Case for the Case Study, in which they discuss the merits 
of the case study approach in social science research, especially compared to the 
dominant reliance on quantitative data and empirical research. The reasons for using the 
case study approach are two-fold. First, it is in line with my desire to “grasp the nature of 
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social action as it has been experienced by people themselves.”123 The purpose of the 
cases is to understand the human behavior and relationships that underlie these 
phenomena, rather than to measure or count them. As such, “the narrative form is 
precisely adapted to communicating these meanings and understandings - the ‘lived’ 
experience - as experienced by people.”124 The second reason is more theoretical and 
relates to the framework I am using not only to justify using the case study method, but 
also to analyze and understand the dynamics at work in each case. As Feagin and Orum 
explain, “Advocates of the natural science model assume that an objective world exists 
independently of the researcher and that one can uncover ‘universal laws’ of human 
nature and social reality…Thus the units of analysis are independent entities. Typically 
they are individuals - human beings - but they can be larger units, such as nation-
states.”125 In contrast, the case study approach and the cognitive sociological framework I 
use in analyzing the cases do not limit its unit of analysis to the individual entity. Instead, 
it embraces the social nature of individual behaviors, positing that there are patterns of 
interaction larger than the individual but smaller than the entirety of society.   
The case study method is unique in its ability to enable analysis of a set of 
relationships or a community - in this case the feminist thought community - and also 
takes into account the inherently social nature of conducting research in the first place. 
By embracing the sociology of knowledge approach to research, one is able to recognize 
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that, “social research is first and foremost a social enterprise,” and to embrace theory “as 
a social process carried out by researchers…taking place within a social context.”126  
One potential criticism of the sociology of knowledge approach, and especially its 
applications in the context of the case study, is that it denies any objectivity or 
measurable reality and deteriorates its subject matter into meaningless subjectivity. In 
addressing this concern, Feagin and Orum write, “We too assume the existence of an 
empirical reality that is somewhat independent of any particular human agent. Moreover, 
human nature and social reality display an order of sorts. However, the nature of human 
nature and of social reality is not as fixed as the proponents of the natural science model 
would have us believe.”127 This seems to be the aspect of the natural science model that 
they are most concerned about: “Researchers cannot remove themselves from their own 
sociocultural setting and achieve objectivity simply by claiming to do so. Although we 
believe some form of objectivity is possible, it cannot be attained through social 
experimentation or complex statistical manipulations.”128 Thus, they see the supposed 
objectivity of a data-driven study to be somewhat disingenuous and misleading, and do 
not think it should be the basis for elevating quantitative research over qualitative 
research. Eviatar Zerubavel, explaining his theory of cognitive sociology, further 
addresses this potential pitfall: “Optical pluralism or perspectivism does not preclude the 
existence of an objective reality. It does, however, tie the validity of the different ‘views’ 
of that reality to particular standpoints rather than to some absolute Truth. As such, it 	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underscores the inherent futility of any attempt to compare different cognitive outlooks to 
one another in terms of their correctness.”129 This notion will be important in analyzing 
the case studies, as it helps to illuminate the dangers of ideologies or movements that 
privilege certain cognitive outlooks over others in a silencing and suppressing way. 
 Understanding the history of the case study is also particularly helpful here, as it 
explains in part why the case study method is useful in my study of feminist thought 
communities. The debate over the value of the case study approach arose in the midst of a 
theoretical controversy in sociology during the 1980s, between Randall Collins and Bruce 
Mayhew, with a third line of thinking offered by Peter Blau. Collins, in agreement with 
neoclassical economists, posited, “the individual is the basic unit of analysis.”130 In 
contrast, Mayhew claimed that sociologists should rid their analyses “of individuals and 
focus solely on macro (or structural) patterns.”131 Finally, Blau sought a middle ground in 
which “the micro and macro levels both have their own integrity and the sociologists are 
more or less destined to focus solely on macro (or structural) patterns.”132 This thesis 
focuses primarily on the structural patterns of the feminist thought community. While the 
individuals I discuss play a central role in this community, “the self and the social mind 
are products of interaction with others, and the concept of an independent actor is foreign 
to such theoretical orientation.”133  
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 The theoretical basis for using the case study as a research method works nicely 
with the analytical frameworks developed by cognitive sociologists such as Karl 
Mannheim and Eviatar Zerubavel. Both Mannheim and Zerubavel were also deeply 
interested in the social nature of individual behaviors, ideas, and worldviews. 
Mannheim’s essay on the Interpretation of Weltanschauung (1923)  
…took up the problem of the proper scientific treatment of 
‘cultural’ objects, such as works of art, philosophy, etc. The main 
thesis is that such objects cannot be treated by the methods of 
natural science, for the correct understanding of cultural 
phenomena always involves the interpretation of meanings, and 
meanings cannot be ‘observed’ like the things with which 
physicists deal. All interpretation, however, presupposes a grasp of 
some totality, some system, of which meaningful elements are 
parts; this is again the idea of ‘structural analysis,’ now applied to 
historical objects.134  
 
In the case of liberation from essence feminist thought communities, we once again see a 
set of ideas, people, and relationships that cannot be treated as objects to be measured and 
observed in a quantitative way, and which in fact can only be observed in the context of 
the larger system in which they exist. This structural approach, which is a fundamental 
feature of the cognitive sociological method developed by Mannheim, means that a 
subject should be evaluated “not as an isolated, self-contained unit, but as part of a wider 
structure; the explanation itself is based not so much on the properties of the thing itself 
as on the place it occupies within the structure. Adopting this ‘structural’ approach, one 
sees that the ‘meaning’ of some individual phenomenon, e.g. an utterance, can be 
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determined only with reference to the conceptual system to which it belongs.”135 In these 
cases, the individual phenomena are liberation from essence feminists and their behaviors 
in the public sphere, and the conceptual system to which they belong is the broader 
feminist thought community and in particular the liberation from essence feminist 
thought community. 
Eviatar Zerubavel’s concept of thought communities is rooted in his theory that, 
while  
the particular way in which we happen to ‘close’ our minds is 
strikingly similar to the way many others around us close theirs, it 
is also quite different from the way many other humans do, which 
serves to remind us that our own particular focusing patterns are by 
no means universal and thereby underscores the need to avoid the 
common epistemological pitfall of reifying our own horizons and 
regarding them as inevitable…Our horizons, in other words, are 
for the most part, neither natural nor logical.136 
 
An adamant belief in one’s own right-ness and a fundamentalist zeal for one’s own 
ideology, in the eyes of someone sympathetic to Zerubavel’s theory, is not only 
intellectually dishonest but also dangerous when carried to its extreme.  
The following case studies will each highlight various problematic aspects of the 
liberation from essence view within the feminist thought community. The first aspect is 
the promotion of a stringent ideology that rests on the idea that there are some choices 
that should count as “feminist” and some that shouldn’t, even when made by an 
informed, autonomous woman. The second aspect is derived from Marxist and Frankfurt 
School thinking - the idea that any supporters of the traditional systems or critics of the 	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new system (in this case, the new system is liberation from essence feminism) are simply 
blinded by their own privilege or ignorance and are tools of society’s systems of 
oppression. The third aspect is intolerance to dissent and an unwillingness to engage with 
views or ideas that are deemed too critical or simply “unfeminist” by the powers that be. 
For female or self-identified feminist critics, any one of these aspects or a combination of 
the three can result in being labeled a traitor and effectively purged from the community. 
These behaviors and the rationales behind them are disturbingly prevalent in the public 
sphere. Using the analytical frameworks developed by Mannheim and Zerubavel, we can 
analyze these interactions to better understand these problematic aspects of liberation 
from essence feminism as it permeates the public sphere. 
Case Study 1: Feminist Efforts to Shame Candace Cameron Bure 
A recent and particularly revealing incident is the case of Candace Cameron Bure. 
Bure, an actress famous for her childhood role on the 1990s TV show “Full House,” is 
now in her late thirties, and has been married to her husband for over twenty years. Bure 
and her husband are known for their Christian faith, and she has also recently begun a 
career as an author. In her most recent book, Balancing It All: My Story of Juggling 
Priorities and Purpose, she discusses her experiences as a working wife and mother.  
The controversy began when Bure appeared in an interview for Huffington Post. 
In the interview, when asked about her book, she explicitly stated:  
It’s not giving you ten steps as to how to balance your life 
perfectly. We all have a unique life and our circumstances are 
different, and I think when we as women, because we all want to 
be able to balance and juggle so many things at the same time and 
we get overwhelmed, and its like, ‘oh well, how does this person, 
how do they seem to be doing this so perfectly all the time?’ and 
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that’s what I talk about in the book, and that each of our lives do 
look unique, so I can’t expect to be balancing my life the same way 
that my neighbor is or this woman is… and I think it will just give 
everyone a big sigh of relief.137  
 
Clearly, Bure is sharing her story with those who are interested, rather than attempting to 
preach or to prescribe a certain lifestyle to everyone. It is clear from her language that she 
sees her book more as a personal story that some might find comforting or inspiring, but 
that she certainly does not see herself as having written a manifesto that she thinks all 
women must follow. 
However, many media outlets, ignoring her stated intentions, found themselves 
preoccupied with a specific passage in her book:  
My husband is a natural-born leader. I quickly learned that I had to 
find a way of honoring his take-charge personality and not get 
frustrated about his desire to have the final decision on just about 
everything. I am not a passive person, but I chose to fall into a 
more submissive role in our relationship because I wanted to do 
everything in my power to make my marriage and family work.138 
 
This quote represents what some might find to be an antiquated view, shaped by strong 
religious beliefs that are rarely found among present day women, let alone among 
celebrities. The ensuing feminist response to her views on her own role in a marriage 
strongly exemplify two problematic aspects of the liberation from essence mindset: first, 
the notion that certain women’s choices are feminist while others’ are not; and second, an 
unwillingness to engage in productive dialogue, instead turning to insults and 
demonization. Women’s fashion magazine Marie Claire tweeted a particularly vicious 	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message regarding Bure’s statements, quipping, “Thanks Candace Cameron, for setting 
women back approximately a billion years…”139 Interestingly, other recent tweets from 
Marie Claire indicate perhaps what the magazine sees as moving women forward. One 
tweet offers a link to read about “How one girl planned her MENAGE A TROIS,” while 
another asks, “The Great Ass Debate: What do guys REALLY think of women’s 
butts?” 140 Yet another tweet tells readers “How to get FREE birth control NOW 
#Obamacare,” with a link to the Marie Claire website.  
Clearly, Marie Claire, as a widely-read mainstream news and lifestyle source for 
women, has identified certain decisions and choices that are pro-woman and certain ones 
that are retrograde and harmful, and they believe it is their duty to pontificate and to 
demonize women who make choices that fall into the wrong category. Leaving aside 
whether or not Bure’s advice on having a successful marriage is perhaps more 
constructive and helpful to the average woman than Marie Claire’s advice on what most 
men think of their backsides, there is a clear dynamic here in which a prominent cultural 
force, in the form of a widely read women’s magazine, attacks an educated, professional 
woman for dissenting from the accepted feminist views on what lifestyle and moral 
beliefs a proper feminist should hold. In this case, Bure is advocating a more traditional, 
religion-oriented view of her role as a woman and a wife, while Marie Claire and Bure’s 
other critics see this view as antiquated and inherently flawed, instead promoting a 
liberation from essence view in which traditional feminine roles and behaviors are 	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rejected and replaced, and in which personal fulfillment and sexual liberation are instead 
considered the most important goals for women. Though Bure is consciously making an 
informed decision to take on a certain role in her seemingly successful and happy 
marriage, her critics insist that this cannot be true: her freely made choice is a bad one, 
one that is “unfeminist” and in some way actively harmful to other women because it 
does not promote a liberation from essence view.  
Many feminists might balk at the accusation that their ideas and theories should 
be associated with Marie Claire or any other mainstream women’s magazines - after all, 
the tweets referenced above are geared almost exclusively towards sexually-liberated, 
straight women in a way that could be deemed objectifying or offensive. Yet, this is 
exactly the point: when a liberation from essence mindset permeates the public sphere, it 
is no longer being dealt with purely in theoretical form. The debate between “difference” 
and “equality” is no longer relevant, and the discussion has instead impacted the average 
person. Bure’s ideas were also heavily criticized on Joan Velez-Mitchell’s CNN show, 
“Headline News.” Velez-Mitchell shrieked, rolled her eyes, interrupted one of the guests 
attempting to explain the Biblical meaning of the term “submissive,” and called Bure’s 
ideas “ridiculous.” Another guest on the show ignored Bure’s previous explanation of the 
purpose of her book, instead falsely claiming that Bure’s goal was to tell other women, 
“do it my way, because that’s the right way.”141 This treatment of Bure’s ideas was not 
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only obnoxious, but it was ignorant and disrespectful – more revealing of the intolerance 
of Velez-Mitchell than the supposed problems with Bure’s lifestyle. 
As discussed earlier, the particularly troubling aspect of this is not necessarily the 
promotion of liberation from essence views over other views, but rather, that only 
decisions and ideas that fall under the liberation from essence umbrella are considered 
valid and worthy of respect. Like Linda Alcoff points out so astutely, there seems to be 
an impasse here in which Bure’s critics privilege the validity of their own worldview and 
ideology over hers. Criticisms like those coming from Marie Claire are the real-world 
product of an ideological theory that uses deconstructionism to undermine any systems, 
traditions, or ideologies that they find problematic without duly applying it to their own 
ideology.  
As demonstrated in the case of Candace Cameron Bure, this tendency is not only 
hypocritical and frustrating for the victims of such ideological attacks, but it is also 
theoretically flawed and fundamentally illiberal. Bure’s critics, while eager to mock and 
criticize her, refused to engage with her ideas on an intellectual level, instead choosing to 
unproductively avoid a serious conversation about the issues she addressed in her book or 
in her particular worldview.  
Case Study 2: Christina Hoff Sommers and the Bullying Behavior Exhibited 
Toward Dissident Feminists 
The mainstream feminist treatment of philosopher and “dissident” feminist 
Christina Hoff Sommers ranges from legitimately argued criticisms to infantile and 
ideological jabs. The latter reactions, of course, are the most interesting to analyze, as 
	   71	  
they are surprisingly prevalent and highly visible to the average person and the general 
public through media sources ranging from Jezebel to the New York Times. Feminist 
news website Jezebel featured a particularly salient article, titled “Dumb Opinion: Little 
Boys Need Toy Guns to Survive,” in response to Hoff Sommers’ article, “School Has 
Become Too Hostile to Boys,” published in Time. The author of the Jezebel piece, Katie 
J.M. Baker, quipped, “Christina Hoff Sommers, champion of conservative feminism and 
boyz II menz rights, argues that schools' "efforts to re-engineer the young-male 
imagination" by penalizing them for loving guns and superheroes are destroying our best 
and brightest young men, who can only be happy and successful if they have big guns in 
their pockets.”142 While one could easily focus only on the author’s exaggerated rhetoric 
and flippant attitude towards the work of a highly regarded academic, the primary point 
illustrated here is the ease and even eagerness with which mainstream feminist journalists 
and figureheads dismiss Hoff Sommers, both academically and politically.  
Multiple other Jezebel articles feature the same attitude of contempt towards 
anyone who dissents from their hardline viewpoint. In an article about gender-neutral 
toys, another Jezebel author, Tom Scocca, mocked Hoff Sommers’ views on the issue: 
“Christina Hoff Sommers - who has made a nice career in the Boys' Toys section of the 
opinion-having business by arguing over and over that men have been victimized by 
feminism - explained to the readers of The Atlantic's website how dangerous this 
intervention in the toy-marketing business really is,” before selectively quoting her with 	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little context or fair analysis.143 Hoff Sommers, who began her career as a liberal feminist 
professor, began to face rabid criticism when she questioned common feminist claims 
and approaches to intellectual inquiry. As she describes it herself,  
In the late 1980s, I began to have disagreements with some of my 
colleagues in philosophy. In 1988, I actually went to the American 
Philosophical Association and read a paper critical of key points in 
academic feminism. I thought it would be a lively debate and that 
people would be angry. That often happens in the American 
Philosophical Association. But you always part as friends and go 
out for drinks and so on. But we did not part as friends at that 
event. People were furious. They were hissing. One woman almost 
fainted. I had never experienced anything like it. That evening I 
was excommunicated from a religion I didn't even know existed.144 
 
Of course, one of her majors criticisms of feminism is exactly that: it functions more as a 
religion than an academic discipline, in which any critics are treated as infidels or 
heretics, rather than intellectual equals who should be taken seriously and engaged with 
respectfully. Hoff Sommers summarizes, “As a philosopher, you have to want dissent. 
That keeps you honest and keeps the research credible. But they didn't appreciate any 
kind of dissent in the movement and that spelled trouble. There is a system of quality 
control in scholarship, it is called criticism. But they were disallowing it.”145 Her 
treatment in the media as a result of making these claims is revealed not only in the 
sarcasm of Jezebel articles but also more seriously in the way she is subtly silenced or 
criticized by those in positions of power. Instead of engaging with her ideas or treating 
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her as an intellectual equal, these critics not only dismiss and mock her work, but also 
seem respond in retaliation to her for dissenting in the first place. 
For example, one particularly illustrative incident occurred when Hoff Sommers 
published Who Stole Feminism? in 1994. The book, a harsh critique of contemporary 
feminism, was not only “met with the bitter hostility of campus feminists,” but was also 
perhaps unfairly treated by the prominent New York Times Book Review.146 The person 
chosen to review it by the New York Times, Nina Auerbach, was a professor and radical 
feminist at the University of Pennsylvania. Hoff Sommers found the decision to have 
Auerbach review her book to be a blatant conflict of interest: “The book was basically 
about her and her sisters. She was even a key figure. The book opens with a parody of a 
feminist conference in which she was a presenter. She couldn't possibly be 
objective…She went on the talk circuit and did radio shows about how she despised the 
book.” 147 The decision to have Auerbach review the book was described by others as 
plainly malicious, resulting in a “predictable trashing,” and criticisms of unethical 
behavior on the part of Auerbach and the editor, Auerbach’s former student, who chose 
her to write the review.148 Beyond these concerns, however, was also the observation that 
such a negative and hasty review by the New York Times is an anomaly: the editor at the 
time was “known to urge authors to find something good in a book or just leave it alone 
and let it die…but it didn’t happen with my book. It was reviewed by the New York Times 	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within days of its publication date - which is again unusual, they are often late and 
authors don't like that. But they were right on target. I think they wanted to kill this 
book.”149 
The other ironic aspect of the Christina Hoff Sommers case is that, in response to 
her criticisms about the lack of scientific and intellectual rigor within feminist circles, 
some groups sunk to the exact levels that she expected them to: “The AAUW, a group 
that did what I think was a very inadequate study of girls and self-esteem, did not reply to 
my criticism or correct the many mistakes I identified but chose instead to fax me pages 
and pages of denunciations and attacks. That was disappointing because that is not the 
way you expect a once very well-regarded organization to behave.” 150  Instead of 
engaging in an intellectual discussion about the merits of their own work or the problems 
with Hoff Sommers’ ideas, the AAUW instead resorted to bullying attacks - precisely the 
type of behavior Hoff Sommers found so disappointing and alarming in the first place.  
Hoff Sommers’ outsider status is also evident in the way she and her school of 
thought - equity feminism - are treated in Bitch magazine article “Everything You 
Always Wanted to Know About Feminism But Were Afraid to Ask.” The article, which 
lists various schools of feminism thought and their definitions, ranging from 
“womanism” to “cultural feminism” to “antiporn feminism,” offers a short and 
uncharitable description of equity feminism: 
This is a sly attempt by antifeminist "feminists"—such as Christina 
Hoff Sommers, author of Who Stole Feminism? (1994), and the 	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freaky neocon think tank called the Independent Women's Forum - 
to appeal to the sentient public that by and large agrees with 
concepts like equal pay for equal work without actually 
acknowledging that sexism still exists. (Who can argue with 
equity?) But as wielded by Hoff Sommers, the IWF, and others, it's 
really just another word for antifeminism, unchecked capitalism, 
corporate welfare, and neoconservatism.151 
 
This description contrasts with the much more positive descriptions of every other form 
of feminism in the article - it is a glaring exception, and its lack of objectivity and 
intentional unfairness is hard to miss.  
 What is perhaps most disturbing about the Christina Hoff Sommers case is that 
there are people who do engage critically with her ideas and treat her as an intellectual 
peer rather than a second-class citizen. Unfortunately, and the reason this dynamic is so 
concerning, the most high-profile responses to Hoff Sommers’ work are vindictive, 
dismissive, and anti-intellectual. These responses in publications such as Jezebel and the 
New York Times are deviations from the norm in that both sources do report far more 
objectively and constructively on other issues and people, making the singling out of 
Hoff Sommers even more concerning and revealing of the targeted silencing mechanisms 
at work.  
Case Study 3: Clementine Ford as an Example of Feminist Hypocrisy and 
Condescension  
Clementine Ford, a contemporary feminist blogger and journalist, represents 
liberation from essence feminism at its illiberal extreme. The following excerpts from 	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two different articles by Ford exemplify the type of rhetoric indicative of the presence of 
liberation from essence ideals in the media. What is most concerning about this particular 
case is that Ford puts forth a disturbing view in which some women’s free and 
autonomous choices are good while other choices are wrong and should be actively 
disrespected. In contrast to those sympathetic to classical liberal notions of freedom and 
individuality, Ford claims that exercising choice alone is not enough to make one free or 
autonomous: “‘Choice’ and the ability to exercise it in and of itself is not a feminist 
act…defending women’s right to choose whatever they like doesn’t mean other women 
have a duty to agree with those choices or even respect them.”152 This is contrary to the 
classical liberal and more commonly accepted belief that an individual who is able to 
make informed choices (provided they are not directly harmful to others) is exercising 
freedom, and should be respected as such. It is interesting that Ford specifically states 
that choice and the ability to make it - a state that characterizes the classical liberal ideal 
of freedom - is not feminist.  
She further explains this viewpoint when she depicts motherhood as incompatible 
with the essential aspects - whatever they may be - which allow one to function 
autonomously. She portrays choosing motherhood as directly in conflict with being free 
or autonomous, suggesting that the feminine essence of and biological need for 
motherhood is different and incompatible with the essence of autonomy. Ford articulates 
what has become a common postmodern feminist approach to understanding freedom and 	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autonomy, especially as they apply to women and feminists: “Mothers also face an 
exclusion in parts of society, and suffer the indignity of being assumed to have lost an 
essential part of their autonomous identities as women. By all means, women should 
make family central to their lives if that's their choice. But it's dangerous to view it as a 
life goal, as an act that will secure happiness at the expense of the pursuits that will 
secure freedom, independence and autonomy.” 153 Here, Ford slightly backtracks on her 
claim that certain women’s choices should not be respected, though she does not hesitate 
to frame decisions such as becoming a mother (a choice made by the vast majority of 
women) as dangerous. 
Here, we see the liberation from essence mindset, and its ties to postmodern 
thinking, at work: despite the fact that for many centuries women have continued to 
become mothers and raise children, Ford treats this pattern of behavior as if it is an 
ignorant and stupid decision made by uninformed women who simply need to be 
educated about the autonomy and independence that they are missing out on. She 
describes women who embrace more traditional views in a particularly disdainful way:   
These stereotypes are sometimes perpetuated by other women who 
have been so successfully sold the myth of their own inferiority 
that they have instead sought symbolic power by presenting 
themselves to men as turncoats; little foot soldiers who can be 
relied upon to reinforce patriarchal norms and whose loyalty is 
rewarded in compliments, pats on the head and a smattering of 
crumbs saved from the table.154 	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Here, Ford continues to belittle women who make choices that she deems unworthy of 
respect, and to question their ability to make such decisions. Ironically, as she criticizes 
the “patriarchy” and traditional roles for women, she is particularly condescending 
towards these women - treating them as if they are incapable of properly evaluating their 
own decisions, are easily coerced, and reducing their behavior to that of small animals 
whose only goal is to gain affection and food rewards. It is interesting to note that 
Mannheim’s legacy is relevant in this aspect of the case. Originally responding to Marxist 
ideology, “Mannheim wanted to go beyond a Marxist orthodoxy according to which 
proletarian class-conscious thought alone represented reality as it was, ‘adequately,’ 
while all those not sharing this class perspective were necessarily deluded.”155 Such an 
endeavor is still quite useful if not necessary in helping to understand some of the 
particularly concerning strands of radicalism today, including liberation from essence 
feminism, in which, similar to Marxist orthodoxy, any dissenters are considered deluded 
lost causes who must be vilified and silenced.  
 Ford’s perplexing treatment of other women and their choices does not stop here, 
however; her opinions on sex workers further illustrate the hypocrisy of the liberation 
from essence mindset. In discussing the way the average person regards sex workers, she 
claims, “Demonizing sex workers under the guise of "helping" them is simply a way of 
expressing puritanical snobbery.”156 She dismisses any other concerns a critic might 	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voice about the dangers of or problems with the sex industry and reduces them all to an 
abstract notion of holier-than-thou prudishness. In defending sex workers and those who 
chose to enter the industry, she opines, “Fundamentally, I support the women and men 
who choose to work in the sex industry regardless of what may have led them to it. We 
make choices about our lives for a number of different reasons, and the context of those 
choices is nobody's business but ours.”157 This declaration that people “make choices” for 
a “number of different reasons” and that the context of those choices is no one else’s 
business seems to apply only to those choices that Ford finds admirable; in this case, 
entering the sex industry must be respected but becoming a mother or getting married 
should be actively criticized.  
 Ford’s mindset and the behaviors analyzed in the previous case studies are 
revealing of the liberation from essence outlook when it is taken to its extreme, leaving 
academia and theoretical discussions and instead impacting the lives of real women in the 
broader social world. While these behaviors are on display in a variety of contentious 
situations in which various ideologies are competing for followers, regardless of political 
or philosophical orientation, it is particularly concerning that these patterns of behavior 
occur under the guise of a movement aimed to help all women. Interactions such as the 
ones described in the case studies suggest that these claims are disingenuous at best and 
intolerant and illiberal at worst. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This analysis of contemporary feminism, and specifically liberation from essence 
feminism derived from the postmodern condition of society, has revealed many flaws in 
the movement - flaws both unique to feminism and flaws that might be found in any 
strong ideological movement. In conducting this analysis, my intent was not to 
undermine the admirable efforts of women who have dedicated their lives and careers to 
improving conditions for women everywhere, and whose intellectual contributions have 
added immensely to our body of knowledge and our ways of thinking about the world 
around us. Rather, my hope was to show the ways in which any ideological movement - 
though in this particular case, feminism - can veer off course and head in an 
unproductive, anti-intellectual, and illiberal direction. I hope it is clear from the cognitive 
sociological approach used in my analysis that my aim has not been to completely 
invalidate certain feminist ideas; rather, it has been a critique of the ways these ideas can 
be manipulated to do more harm than good.  
 My research in preparing this thesis has indicated many times over that there are 
many men and women who are rooting for a more productive and appealing worldview to 
evolve out of the current state of feminist thought. From intellectuals to celebrities to 
students, there is a market for a worldview that recognizes the importance of freedom and 
autonomy but does not take these abstract notions to their radical extremes, isolating the 
average person in the process. While I will leave the development of a new feminist 
theory to philosophers such as Christina Hoff Sommers and Linda Alcoff (for now), it is 
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clear from this analysis that there are several key steps that must be taken in order to 
enable and facilitate the process.  
 The first step is for high-profile universities, media sources, and individuals to 
prioritize constructive dialogue and to promote intellectual diversity over the bullying 
and vindictive behavior that has become disturbingly prevalent in both the classroom and 
the public sphere. While this may not be a realistic expectation for individuals or 
publications that acknowledge a strong bias in a particular direction, universities, 
professors, and those who purport to work for unbiased or balanced publications should 
readily address this issue. Authors such as Patai and Koertge should continue to set an 
example by criticizing anti-intellectual behaviors within university and educational 
settings, and critics should continue to respond when a supposedly balanced publication 
such as the New York Times Book Review tendentiously reviews a work by a notably 
contentious author.  
It is vital that critics point out the disingenuous nature of universities that claim to 
promote liberal educational values, yet routinely allow debate and conversation to be 
stifled. This is especially true in departments known for these types of issues, and it 
should be made quite clear to students and professors alike that “Since Women’s Studies 
programs function as parts of colleges and universities, they are expected to offer their 
students at least the semblance of a liberal education; they could not otherwise justify 
their status within academic institutions.”158 This is a cause that any intellectual or 
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academic should support, regardless of personal political views or ideology. 
Controversial feminist author Kate Roiphe, responding to the question, “Who gets to be a 
feminist?” grasps the challenging nature of this issue quite adeptly: 
I am suspicious of a movement that wants to dictate a checklist of 
ideology, that wants to project into the world a party line of 
acceptable beliefs. Instead, to be vibrant and strong and relevant, 
feminism should include people with disparate and conflicting 
views; it should have room for Mary Wollstonecraft, and Emma 
Goldman, and Camille Paglia, and Christina Hoff Sommers. It 
should have room for those who are, for instance, pro- and anti-
choice. Once we start itemizing: She is allowed, she is not allowed 
- admittedly a schoolyard instinct women seem to love and don't 
ever really outgrow - we have to ask who gets to choose?159 
 
Roiphe clearly understands the importance of maintaining pluralism and room for debate, 
discussion, and progress in any movement that purports to be intellectual and claims 
space in the academy. A movement that does not embrace these ideals might as well be a 
political party or a religious group, and its fervor and close-mindedness would surely 
mean it could not claim a special place in a liberal arts setting.  
 Second, those attempting to disseminate feminist ideas in the public sphere should 
recognize that, while abstruse radical rhetoric might play a valuable role in theoretical 
discussions, it is not a practical way to engage a mainstream audience.  When feminists 
use this type of rhetoric, claiming that those who do not agree with their views are simply 
ignorant of all the oppression they face or are unwitting tools coerced by the patriarchy, 
they isolate many women (not to mention men). If feminists’ intended audience is not 	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engaging with their ideas as planned, the situation may call for revisiting their arguments 
and evidence, rather than condescending to and belittling anyone who disagrees.  As 
Patai and Koertge emphasize, “Responsibility for the difficulties faced by Women’s 
Studies lies, in our view, not primarily with malevolent patriarchy and its effects but with 
the ideological variant of feminism that has been embraced by and incorporated into the 
academy.”160 By embracing a more liberal pedagogical and rhetorical approach, feminists 
could not only engage a much broader audience, but could build academic and 
intellectual credibility for Women’s Studies among both those who attempt to discredit it 
out of ignorance and those who have been driven out by overzealous ideologues.  
 Additionally, in order to promote a feminism that most humans will be able to 
relate to, feminists should give serious consideration to the ways in which they can 
promote respect for individuals’ informed choices about how to pursue a career or a 
family, even if they would not make such a choice themselves. This has been a point of 
tension in the feminist movement for decades, and does not seem any closer to a 
reasonable resolution than it was many years ago. Even Betty Friedan recognized the 
importance of addressing this issue. Though her ideas were revolutionary at the time, 
they are at odds with those of later feminists. Of her rift with her feminist successors, 
Freidan remarked, “I’m at odds with the radical feminists because I’m not anti-marriage 
and anti-family. I always thought it was dangerous to go against the idea of the family. I 
don’t even like the phrase ‘women’s liberation’ because that idea of being set free from 
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everything doesn’t seem right to me.”161 Like Friedan, the average woman in a Western 
country may not actually know what she is supposed to be liberated from, as many 
women make informed and enthusiastic decisions to marry and have children as a central 
part of their identity, contrary to whatever their feminist critics may say. 
 In this vein, it would be far more productive for feminists to embrace the classical 
liberal roots of their ideology by recognizing what Hoff Sommers calls “the great 
achievement of feminism” - asserting the truth “that women are individuals.”162 It follows 
from this that “it's going to be hard to have any group that represents the ‘women's point 
of view.’ We are not locked into a single point of view. There are women conservatives. 
There are radicals. There are anarchists. There are the traditionalists, and so forth. We are 
diverse, we are individuals. So it's going to be hard to have a movement that represents 
all of us. And that's one of the things I object to.”163 There is no way to please everyone - 
but it is possible to promote women’s (and everyone’s) individual liberties and to 
advocate for women to seek the education and information they need to maximize these 
liberties. 
 Finally, I think it is crucial to acknowledge the immense progress that has already 
been made for women and men everywhere. John Ellis, a harsh critic of feminists’ 
reluctance to admit this progress, somewhat exaggeratedly suggests that feminists address 
this issue: “Nonetheless, powerful emotional resistance prevents many feminists 	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(especially radical feminists) from accepting the fact that the capitalist economies of the 
West have been the engine for change for women. Rather than lament the entire past of 
humanity as one long display of male oppression, they should focus on exploring the 
promising but uncharted future.”164 While this suggestion is a bit snarky, its underlying 
message is important: there has been rapid and unprecedented economic progress over 
the last two centuries that has immensely improved living conditions across the world 
and has enabled feminists to explore and carry out many of their goals. This progress 
suggests an optimistic future to look forward to, including rapidly improving outlooks for 
more men and women in still-developing parts of the world - hardly something to dismiss 
as part of the patriarchy or to ignore for fear of becoming irrelevant.  
 Interestingly, and perhaps comfortingly, Ann Snitow, cited earlier for her disdain 
for womanhood and promotion of androgyny, made one of the most salient comments I 
have seen regarding the state of feminism. It seems particularly apt to quote her here, as 
she seems to truly grasp the reasons why feminists find it so difficult to develop a 
cohesive movement with mainstream appeal, and at the same time, to recognize how such 
a movement might develop in the future. Snitow writes,  
Culture offers a variety of rewards to women for always giving 
attention to others first. Love is a special female responsibility. 
Some feminists see this female giving as fulfilling and morally 
powerful. Others see it as a mark of oppression and argue that 
women are given the job of ‘life,’ but that any job relegated to the 
powerless is one undervalued by the society as a whole. Yet in our 
group there was one area of agreement: Traditional women’s 
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concerns - for life, for children, for peace - should be 
everyone’s.165 
 
Perhaps the most appealing and effective feminist movement would recognize that most 
men and women do value life and children, and that a movement centered solely on the 
subversion of social norms and expectations, development of individual autonomy, and 
personal fulfillment may be both unappealing to the average person and harmful to 
society. This does not mean that a regressive shift to traditional obligations to family, 
church, or the state is necessarily in order; however, it does mean that the human need for 
these common values and ways of belonging - reminiscent of Durkheim’s collective 
consciousness - might be more effectively incorporated into feminist ideology in order to 
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